November 12, 2025 12:51 PM IST First published on: Nov 12, 2025 at 12:51 PM ISTAn explosion at 6.52 pm on November 10, in a Hyundai i20 car moving slowly near Red Fort Metro Station, Delhi, killed at least 13 people and wounded over 20. The explosion occurred hours after the Jammu & Kashmir Police announced they had, through arrests of seven people, busted an “inter-state and transnational” terror module linked with terror groups Jaish-e-Mohammad and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind. The police also recovered nearly 2,900 kg of bomb-making materials, including 350 kg of ammonium nitrate, 20 timers, two dozen remote controls, a rifle with ammunition, among other items, during its raids.This terror act has set off the usual refrain of “intelligence failure.” However, we need to recognise that India’s intelligence and security agencies, who work unsung, have a commendable record in foiling hundreds of such plots – terror entities need to succeed just once. Besides, there’s been a fundamental shift from the traditional large, hierarchical terrorist organisations and directly-supported terrorism, to the “lone wolf”/small autonomous cells model.AdvertisementPre-9/11, terrorists could obtain forged identities and travel documents. In the absence of comprehensive databases and secure transnational communication between law enforcement agencies, there was no way to verify these. As technological advances made document counterfeiting and alteration more difficult, terrorist entities began obtaining basic identity documents for subsequent passport acquisition. But post-9/11, more rigorous countermeasures were introduced, such as complex and refined databases, monitoring of communications and social media based on keyword isolation, of fund transfers, controls on military-grade explosives, etc. These essentially led to three major changes in terrorist tradecraft.First, terrorist entities began looking for “clean skin” operatives, i.e., those who weren’t on the “radar” of law enforcement and could thus move around using legitimate travel documents. The recruitment of educated people is part of that construct. The study The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment, and Death, co-authored by Christine Fair, and published by the Combating Terrorism Centre, US Military Academy, West Point (New York), analysed biographical information and other key details of 917 LeT militants killed in India. It makes a startling point: That the LeT recruited well-educated, highly-skilled young men from the same societal segments as the Pakistani military, and “some [were] Pakistan’s best and brightest”.Also Read | Red Fort blast is a reminder: Terror’s new footprint is an urgent challengeSecond, explosives are increasingly being improvised by utilising common items. Both ammonium nitrate and TATP (triacetone triperoxide) have emerged as favourites of terrorists worldwide. Ammonium nitrate, readily available as fertiliser, can be turned into a powerful explosive when mixed with a fuel oil to create ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate-Fuel Oil). Timothy McVeigh used two tons of ANFO for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, killing 168 people. TATP, although unstable, was used in the November 2015 suicide attack in France and by the “Shoe-Bomber” Richard Reid in his failed attempt to bomb an aircraft in 2001.AdvertisementThird, there is the “lone wolf”/small autonomous cells model with remotely-assisted self-radicalisation. Although extremists like Abu Musab al-Suri first promoted such “leaderless resistance” after the post-9/11 response began severely degrading Al Qaeda, this theme was picked up by almost every major terrorist entity. However, self- and local-radicalisation has its limits, and this shows up as poor levels of operational security exercised by the terrorists, bomb-making skills and operational tradecraft.most readComing back to the Red Fort blast, given the recovery of explosives, it seems the perpetrators had a far bigger terrorist plot in mind. But the arrests likely panicked the remaining culprits, prompting them to either commit the act in advance and use a vehicle-based IED, or shift the remaining materials, leading to a premature and accidental explosion. Explosives need to be tamped down (metal scrap, nails, ball bearings, etc) for maximising effect – but if that’s not done, the explosion finds the easiest path to vent – which perhaps explains the lack of a crater and shrapnel in the Red Fort blast.The writer, a retired Army officer, was the principal director in the National Security Council Secretariat