SUPPORT ETHIOPIA INSIGHT .wpedon-container .wpedon-select, .wpedon-container .wpedon-input { width: 200px; min-width: 200px; max-width: 200px; } Ethiopia’s bid for sea access risks igniting Afar nationalism across borders.Once united by trade routes and shared faith along the Red Sea, the Afar now find themselves divided among three states—Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti —and entangled in a struggle not of their own making.As Ethiopia revives its ambition for maritime access and Eritrea seeks to defend its hard-won coastline, Afar identity has become a convenient battlefield.Centuries-old grievances and colonial scars are being weaponized anew, transforming a marginalized people into pawns in the Horn of Africa’s unfolding contest for maritime power.The Horn is again on edge, its fragile peace strained by a renewed rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea. At the heart of this tension lies Ethiopia’s urgent push for a port, a goal Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has cast as an existential necessity for a landlocked nation of more than 130 million.In pursuit of this objective, Addis Ababa is turning to an unlikely lever: the shared identity and historic grievances of the Afar people across borders.To grasp this strategy, one must recall the Afar’s fractured history. For centuries, they inhabited prosperous Islamic sultanates that spanned the Red Sea coast and inland plains.That unity unraveled in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when European colonial powers redrew the map. Italy annexed the coastal zones to create Eritrea, France carved out Djibouti, and Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik II incorporated the inland Afar territories into his expanding empire.This partition tore apart a culturally and socially connected community, scattering it under three administrations and severing its access to the sea.The legacy of this fragmentation remains deep. The Afar’s collective identity and political cohesion have been weakened, leaving them vulnerable to manipulation by stronger powers.Today, their cause is invoked by governments in Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Djibouti, each claiming to champion Afar unity while pursuing its own strategic ends. Thus, the dispute over the port of Assab is not merely about logistics or trade corridors; it revives old colonial wounds and unsettled disputes of belonging and sovereignty.The rise of transnational Afar nationalism now adds an unpredictable layer to the Horn’s volatile geopolitics, threatening to reopen borders—both literal and imagined—that have long defined the region’s fragility.Ethiopia’s CalculusEthiopia’s current strategy combines short-term tactical gains with long-term objectives, focusing on the grievances of the Eritrean Afar population against the government in Asmara. By invoking Afar victimhood under President Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopia positions itself as a patron of Afar self-determination.Recent reports indicate that armed Eritrean opposition groups—such as the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO), Brigade Nhamedu, and the Eritrean National Salvation Front—have established bases in Ethiopia’s Afar region.Ethiopia-backed RSADO recently announced the graduation of new fighters after a three-month training program in October, with its leaders signaling ambitions that extend beyond Afar unity to developing naval capabilities aligned with Ethiopia’s Red Sea objectives.Addis Ababa is reportedly facilitating cooperation among these groups, despite their internal disputes, to create a united front against Eritrea.This strategy aims to pressure the Eritrean government, potentially forcing it to focus on border security and opening the door for future diplomacy.Empowering Afar political actors is another key aspect of Ethiopia’s strategy. The previously marginalized Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP) has merged with the ruling Prosperity Party, and Aisha Mohammed from the Afar region now leads the powerful defense ministry.This integration enhances Addis Ababa’s political legitimacy and supports broader nation-building efforts. Furthermore, the involvement of Afar Special Forces in the Tigray conflict has strengthened trust between federal and regional leaders, aligning with Abiy’s signature goal of securing sea access.Recently, top government officials visited Bure, a town near the Eritrean border in Afar, a move Asmara likely views as an escalation.Ethiopia’s assertive stance is driven by economic imperatives. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has emphasized that Ethiopia’s loss of access to the Red Sea was a historical mistake that must be corrected.Some Ethiopian political elites even question the legitimacy of Eritrea’s 1993 independence, arguing the separation occurred without a constitutionally legitimate government in Addis Ababa.On 28 October 2025, Abiy underscored that Ethiopia’s loss of sea access is not officially documented, stressing the need to rectify this due to its legal, historical, and existential implications.However, internal challenges constrain Ethiopia’s external influence. Ongoing conflicts in Tigray, instability in Amhara and Oromia, and sporadic clashes involving regions like Afar and Somali have deepened national divisions.Abiy’s mediation efforts between Afar and Somali leaders aim to promote national unity and present a cohesive front.Eritrean CountermovesEritrea’s 1993 independence severed cross-border Afar linkages and ended their coastal autonomy. Afar factions that resisted this new reality, like the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), faced brutal crackdowns, leaving deep scars in the Afar political memory.Unsurprisingly, Eritrea perceives Ethiopia’s proxy strategy as a direct threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Abiy’s hints at “shared access” are interpreted as an attempt to reopen questions settled by a thirty-year war.In response, Eritrea has mobilized military reserves, deployed heavy weaponry along its border, and revived its own proxy channels, arming groups like the TPLF and Amhara Fano.This has created a complex web of destabilizing proxy conflicts, with each state exploiting the other’s vulnerabilities.Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gideon Timotheos has accused Isaias’ government of financing insurgent groups to destabilize Addis Ababa, further heightening tensions. Eritrea, in turn, has denounced Ethiopia’s military build-up as provocative and its diplomatic communications as deceitful, accusing Addis Ababa of harboring irredentist ambitions.The region has thus become a high-stakes chessboard of insurgency and counter-insurgency, raising the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.Internal FissuresEthiopia’s proxy strategy is complicated by divisions within the Afar political landscape. The Afar people are not a unified bloc; their allegiances are fragmented and conditional.While some leaders view alignment with Ethiopia as beneficial, others fear cooptation and eventual abandonment once their utility wanes, worrying that Ethiopia’s national interests will ultimately supersede those of the Afar community.These internal tensions were evident when Ibrahim Osman Aliyu, a prominent Afar politician, defected to Eritrea with his supporters. His defection was triggered by the Ethiopian government’s reconciliation with the Issa Somalis, a historical rival of the Afar.This incident exposes a critical flaw in Ethiopia’s approach, as Eritrea can exploit such divisions to undermine the unity Addis Ababa seeks to maintain. The proxy conflict thus unfolds not only between states but within the Afar community itself.Concurrently, Eritrea is working to isolate Ethiopia diplomatically by forming alliances with neighboring Somalia and Sudan, as well as with Egypt, a historic adversary with which Ethiopia has ongoing disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.Djibouti FalloutThe Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry has broader implications for regional stability. Djibouti, a key Ethiopian ally and host to major international military bases, views Addis Ababa’s support for Afar irredentism as a threat to its national unity.Djibouti’s population is a mix of Afar and Issa Somalis, with the latter dominating the state since independence.Ethnic clashes between the Issa and Afar communities in Ethiopia’s Sitti zone in 2021–2022 spilled over into Djibouti City, resulting in property damage and highlighting fragile cross-border tensions. Addis Ababa’s occasional endorsements of a “Greater Afar” movement alarm Djibouti’s Issa elite, who see it as an existential provocation.The Djiboutian civil war, which raged from 1991 to 1994, pitted pro-Afar factions like the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) against government forces and resulted in significant casualties and displacement.Although a 1994 peace agreement brought some Afar into governance, a radical FRUD faction continues a low-level insurgency.In October 2022, FRUD rebels attacked an army barracks in the Afar-majority north, killing soldiers and taking hostages in opposition to the “Issa-dominated system” under President Ismail Omar Guelleh.Tensions are further rising as President Guelleh, 77, proposes constitutional changes that could allow him to extend his rule indefinitely, amid reports of a possible coup attempt.If Guelleh were to step down, the Afar community might press for greater political power, likely facing opposition from the Issa community. His prolonged rule averts immediate rupture but deepens Afar resentment.The presence of FRUD in Ethiopia and the growing capabilities of RSADO cause further unease in Djibouti. In a significant escalation, Djibouti carried out an airstrike in February on an armed Afar group inside Ethiopian territory as a warning to Addis Ababa.Djibouti is also deporting Oromo migrants as political pressure and strengthening ties with Egypt to counter Ethiopia’s regional ambitions, moves that could strain its critical economic and strategic relationship with Ethiopia.Inevitable BlowbackAddis Ababa’s use of Afar ethnonationalism as a foreign policy tool may backfire internally, potentially destabilizing Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system, where numerous groups seek self-determination.Promoting Afar unity abroad while suppressing domestic irredentist movements—such as those advocating Greater Somalia, a unified Oromia, or “Greater Tigray”—is an inconsistent approach that could reignite ethnic conflicts.This risks national fragmentation and threatens Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, recalling the destructive path of past conflicts.Ethiopia’s quest for sea access is economically justified but fraught with peril. A lasting resolution will require deft diplomacy—through frameworks like Djibouti’s Tadjourah proposal or Turkey-mediated talks—guided by respect for coastal sovereignty and a commitment to regional stability.Ultimately, leaders in the Horn of Africa must choose between nationalist competition and pragmatic coexistence. This decision will determine whether the region’s future is one of cooperation and mutual prosperity or destructive conflict. .wpedon-container .wpedon-select, .wpedon-container .wpedon-input { width: 200px; min-width: 200px; max-width: 200px; } Query or correction? Email us window.addEventListener("sfsi_functions_loaded", function(){if (typeof sfsi_widget_set == "function") {sfsi_widget_set();}}); While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.Main photo: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Ismail Omar Guelleh meet in Djibouti, March 2025. 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