Beneath the choreography of the Xi-Trump meeting at the APEC Summit in Busan, Republic of Korea, President Xi Jinping proposed a bigger idea than tariff swaps: the establishment of a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), a multilateral body to shape the rules of the AI age. The G-2 handshake on 30 October drew headlines. The Chinese AI governance bid, announced on 1 November building on an idea first flagged in China by Premier Li Qiang in July, may shape the century.WAICO is not an isolated initiative. It is the latest link in a chain of Beijing-authored frameworks designed to rewrite multilateralism in China’s syntax. Over the past four years, China has launched the Global Development, Security, Civilisation, and AI Governance Initiatives. Each positions Beijing as a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker. The Global AI Governance Initiative, announced at the Third Belt and Road Forum in 2023, was the conceptual rehearsal; WAICO is its institutional sequel.AdvertisementAdd this year’s Tianjin Initiative on Global Governance and the pattern is clear. Every forum is a launchpad for a new Chinese frame. WAICO is the algorithmic expression of that ambition.The tone is global, but the design is Chinese. Diplomacy, like software, has layers of code. The structure is formally multilateral, yet functionally China-centric. The proposed headquarters is Shanghai. Geography is not neutral. When finance was globalised and trade liberalised, the West wrote the rules at Bretton Woods and housed the referees in Geneva. Now, Beijing seeks both the rulebook and the referee under its roof.Scepticism shouldn’t become cynicism. China’s willingness to invest political capital and cash in AI governance deserves consideration. WAICO’s Action Plan for Global AI Governance proposes a technology-sharing platform and an algorithmic compensation fund financed by global AI revenues. Progressive ideas, but who controls the fund? Who decides which algorithms are safe, fair, or exportable? Without transparent oversight and real checks, noble aims harden into monopolies of influence.AdvertisementA rare success in multilateral cooperation this year has been the United Nations’ AI track. In August, the UN General Assembly agreed to establish an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to advance scientific understanding and ensure informed deliberations. China presents WAICO as a complement to these efforts, describing it as a “support mechanism” that operationalises the UN’s aims. The test is whether the new body can mirror the UN’s openness or install a parallel lane with different defaults.Western capitals view it differently. Washington opposes any forum where the digital rules are set on Chinese terms. Brussels, advancing its AI Act, will hedge for interoperability through the UN but guard its regulatory primacy.For much of the Global South, the initiative is enticing. It promises long-denied access to technology, funding, and training. Beijing speaks to the South’s desire for inclusion, and that resonance should not be underestimated. India should recognise the appeal, but respond with caution. It should engage without endorsing.Three filters apply.Transparency over geography: If offices sit in Shanghai, governance must sit with the world through open budgets, rotating leadership, balanced staffing, and independent audits.Interoperability over ideology: India’s digital public infrastructure proves that openness and sovereignty can coexist. That example should inform any global template.Access over allegiance: The contest is not about words but about chips, cloud, and compute power. Any body that gates access defines development.The proposal should be assessed against hard questions. Who qualifies for membership? Who pays and who decides? How will privacy, surveillance, and open-source norms be balanced? What happens if WAICO rules clash with domestic laws? Will it align with UN guidance and other international standards? Until these are answered, enthusiasm is premature.India could suggest terms. First, a clear firewall between governance and industrial policy so that standards do not become a backdoor for market capture. Second, compute access quotas for developing countries, delivered through a transparent registry. Third, a grievance process that allows member states, firms, and civil society to appeal decisions.India also needs to look beyond formal institutions. Networks of regional hubs, flexible partnerships among governments and research institutions, and adaptive coalitions that evolve with technology can perhaps offer a more plural and resilient model. These avoid rigid architectures that replicate geopolitical hierarchies.As AI becomes the currency of influence, even well-meaning initiatives can be weaponised. Standards are power. Once defaults are set, they are hard to rewrite. Better to ask hard questions early than live with rules others write.The world does need a forum for AI governance. The question is whether WAICO will serve that need or subsume it. If assessed as genuinely multilateral, India should engage with it and shape the rules. If it becomes a proxy for influence, Delhi must be ready to challenge it or it will be ruled by the rules others write.AI will determine not only who innovates but who defines what innovation means. The algorithms of power are being written now, and their authorship matters.In diplomacy, as in coding, what you fail to debug early becomes the system later.The writer is former permanent representative of India to the United Nations, and dean, Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad