Israel’s attack on Syria: Protecting the Druze minority or a regional power play?

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A new round of violence recently erupted in southern Syria, where clashes between local Druze militias and Sunni fighters have left hundreds dead. In response, Israel launched airstrikes in and around the province of Sweida on July 15, saying it was acting to protect the Druze minority and to deter attacks by Syrian government forces. The strikes mark Israel’s most serious escalation in Syria since December 2024, and they underline a growing trend in its foreign policy: the use of minority protection as a tool of regional influence and power projection.The Druze minorityThe Druze, a small but strategically significant ethno-religious group, have historically occupied a precarious position in the politics of Syria, Israel and Lebanon. With an estimated million members across the Levant — a sub-region of west Asia that forms the core of the Middle East — the Druze have often tried to preserve their autonomy amid broader sectarian and political upheavals. In Syria, they make up about three per cent of the population, concentrated largely in the southern province of Sweida.Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in late 2024 and the rise of a new Islamist-led government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Druze in southern Syria have resisted central authority. Though not united in their stance, many Druze militias have rejected integration into the new Syrian army, preferring to rely on local defence networks. The latest wave of violence, sparked by the abduction of a Druze merchant, has been met with both brutality from pro-government forces and military retaliation by Israel.Truly protecting Syrian minorities?Israeli officials says they intervened to protect the Druze, which is not unprecedented. Over the past year, Israel has increasingly portrayed itself as a defender of threatened minorities in Syria — rhetoric that echoes past efforts to align with non-Arab or marginalized groups, such as the Kurds and certain Christian communities. This strategy may be less about humanitarian goals and, in fact, much more deeply political.By positioning itself as a regional protector of minorities, Israel could be seeking to craft a narrative of moral authority, particularly as it faces growing international outrage over its policies in the West Bank and Gaza. This is an example of what scholars refer to as strategic or nation branding by states to cultivate legitimacy and influence through selective interventions and symbolic gestures.But Israel’s actions may not just concern image. They could also be part of a broader geopolitical strategy of containment and fragmentation. The new authorities in Syria are seen as a significant threat, particularly because of the presence of Islamist factions operating near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. By creating what is in effect a buffer zone in southern Syria, Israel’s goal may be to prevent the entrenchment of hostile entities along its northern border while also capitalizing on Syria’s internal fragilities.Strategic risksWith sectarian tensions resurfacing in Syria, the Israeli government probably sees an opportunity to build informal alliances with disaffected groups like the Druze, who may be skeptical of the new Syrian government. This reflects a shift in Israel’s foreign policy from reactive deterrence to proactive strategic disruption.This approach is not without risks. While some Druze leaders have welcomed Israeli support, others — particularly in Syria and Lebanon — have accused Israel of stoking sectarian tensions to justify military intervention and advance territorial or security aims. Such accusations echo longstanding criticisms that Israel’s involvement in regional conflicts is often guided less by humanitarian concern and more by cold strategic calculation.This new phase in Israeli foreign policy also fits into a broader pattern I’ve previously written about — the increasing revisionism of Israel’s regional strategy under Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership. That strategy seemingly seeks to upend multilateral norms, bypass traditional diplomacy and pursue influence through direct engagement — often militarized — with non-state entities and marginalized communities. Read more: How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu's aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East Israel’s July 15 strikes, and an attack on Syria’s Ministry of Defence in Damascus the following day, have drawn strong condemnation from Arab states, Turkey and the United Nations. While Israeli officials have justified the attacks as defensive and humanitarian, the intensity and symbolic targets suggest a deeper intention: to demonstrate operational reach, and, more importantly, actively engage in a redesign of the region with fragmentation and state weakness as the main objective.Fragmentation of the Middle EastThe United States, while expressing concern over the violence, has largely remained silent on Israel’s expanding role in Syria. This could further embolden Israeli actions in a region where international norms are being increasingly upended and traditional great power engagement is waning.Sectarian clashes are likely to continue in Sweida and beyond as Syria’s central government struggles to reassert control. That means that for Israel, the opportunity to deepen its footprint in southern Syria under the guise of minority protection remains.But despite its effort to present itself as a stable, moral presence in an otherwise chaotic neighbourhood, Israel could be undermining the very stability it says it wants to protect as it militarizes humanitarianism.The world is not not just witnessing a series of airstrikes or another episode of sectarian violence in the Middle East. It’s watching a profound transformation in the regional order — one in which traditional borders, alliances and identities are being reshaped. Amid this environment, Israel’s role could evolve not just as a military power, but as a revisionist nation navigating, and helping to bring about, the fragmentation of the Middle East.Spyros A. Sofos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.