The brief video of Prime Minister Narendra Modi holding hands with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin has gone viral. The three-way handshake, occurring against the backdrop of US President Donald Trump’s relentless effort to bully friend and foe alike, symbolises a moment when major powers are jockeying for geopolitical advantage. Yet a photo-op does not a grand alliance make.If anything, the impracticality of a Eurasian coalition against America is highlighted by Modi’s absence from China’s spectacular military parade in Beijing on Wednesday to mark its victory in World War II. Xi will preside over the display of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) formidable military prowess in Tiananmen Square. Modi’s decision to skip the parade underlines India’s continuing distance from Beijing’s efforts to reinterpret the past for present purposes. Those who claimed that the SCO handshake buried the Quad will note that Modi’s absence puts him in the same company as the leaders of Australia, Japan, and the United States, who will also stay away.AdvertisementIn September 1945, Imperial Japan surrendered, ending the war in Asia. In Europe, the victors and a defeated Germany collectively mark the end of hostilities. Asia, however, remains divided in its memory. Reconciliation is elusive even eight decades later. China calls its commemoration, “The Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War”. Yet the military parade, arguably, is less about the past and more about enduring rivalries. Beijing seeks to mobilise nationalist sentiment against Japan and position itself as Asia’s pre-eminent power.Tokyo, unsurprisingly, urged countries not to attend. Australia, India, and the US — all critical to the Allied victory in Asia — declined invitations, as did Britain, France, and the Netherlands (the European powers with a major presence in Asia in World War II). For the Quad powers, participation would have been less about celebrating the shared struggle of 1945 than legitimising China’s aspirations for the domination of Asia. By contrast, many Southeast and Central Asian leaders have shown up in Beijing. Their attendance is less about the War’s memory than about signalling positive sentiments towards China. One notable absence is the Philippines, a major theatre of World War II. It is now at the receiving end of Chinese military power in the South China Sea.Why does the memory of the same war divide Asia so sharply? Because national experiences differed profoundly. China endured 14 years of brutal Japanese occupation, but the war was also about the communists’ triumph over the nationalists. Korea suffered colonisation and then division. Southeast Asia welcomed as well as fought a rising Japan in Asia.AdvertisementIndia’s experience was equally complex. Its emerging nationalist elite was divided in its response to the War, and it also suffered the division of the nation on religious lines. The Indian Army fought the Japanese in Burma and took the surrender of Japanese forces in Rangoon, Singapore, Jakarta, and Hanoi. Yet there was also the Indian National Army (INA), led by Subhas Chandra Bose and backed by Tokyo. For Bose, an alliance with Japan was a path to independence from Britain.Bose’s INA also underlines the complexity of the regional memory of Japanese imperialism. Japan styled itself as Asia’s liberator from European colonialism. Its slogan, “Asia for Asians”, had much resonance in the region. Nationalists in Burma, Indonesia, and Indochina initially welcomed Tokyo’s promise of solidarity and support. Japan trained militias, weakened European colonial rulers, and briefly inspired hopes of independence. But the occupation soon revealed its brutal face — resource plunder, forced labour, and repression. For much of Asia, Japan became both the oppressor and midwife of decolonisation.If Indian and Chinese nationalists shared an anti-imperial sentiment, why did they not collaborate? The answer lies in the adversaries they faced. India’s battle was against Britain, China’s against Japan. Indian nationalism was deeply divided. Gandhi refused to back Britain’s war effort, launching Quit India in 1942. Bose allied with Japan and raised the INA. The Indian communists, a powerful force then, initially dismissed the War as an “inter-imperialist” conflict. After Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, they became staunch supporters of the anti-fascist war.The Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek’s 1942 visit to India and his meeting with Gandhi did little to bridge the gap. China, which found itself on the side of the victorious Allies, gained much in the post-War settlements and the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Despite its massive contributions to the Allied victory, India got little to show for it after the War thanks to its internal divisions.Indian and Chinese nationalist movements failed to find solidarity at a critical juncture in the 20th century despite their shared sense of anti-imperialism. Since then, their repeated efforts to find common ground have been unsuccessful. That situation has not changed with an hour-long meeting between Modi and Xi in Tianjin on Monday. Modi’s refusal to attend the Beijing parade underscores the deep divergence in how Delhi and Beijing interpret the past and envision Asia’s future.South Asia is well represented at the parade, with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan sending delegations. Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, who will be at the parade today, might well claim credit for the undivided Indian Army’s contributions to victory in Asia — a historical irony that should not be lost on Delhi.most readWhen the PLA goose-steps across Tiananmen Square, Asia will be reminded of a war that deeply divided the region. The military spectacle in Beijing today may project unity, but the guest list reveals division. The real challenge for Asia is not simply to remember the past but to escape being trapped by it.For India, the challenge is more complex. World War II left Delhi struggling with the consequences of the geopolitical fragmentation of the Subcontinent and Partition. The Indian elite’s misreading of the politics of that era proved costly. Today, the stakes are equally high. India risks repeating the error if it fails to grasp the dynamic interplay between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing and define a clear sense of its own interests.The writer is a distinguished professor at the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, O P Jindal Global University, holds the Korea Foundation Chair on Asian Geopolitics at the Council on Strategic and Defence Research, and is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express