The Bihar Assembly election results have reshaped the state’s political landscape. The National Democratic Alliance’s (NDA) resounding victory delivered a devastating verdict on the opposition Mahagathbandhan (MGB), exposing a coalition paralysed by its own history and fatally incapable of evolving beyond repeated failures.At its core, this election was a story of two coalitions moving in opposite directions. The NDA successfully consolidated its core constituencies, the BJP secured the upper-caste vote, Nitish Kumar’s JDU retained its hold on the Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) and Mahadalits, and Chirag Paswan’s LJP(RV) mobilised Dalit votes. This traditional caste-based arithmetic was further strengthened by a new social calculus: The “M-Y” (Mahila-Youth) formula. A vast section of women and young voters, swayed by the promise of stability and tangible welfare benefits like the Rs 10,000 direct cash transfers to 1.3 crore women, rallied behind the NDA, forming a decisive bloc that cut across caste lines.AdvertisementIn stark contrast, the MGB remained trapped in the past. One of its major flaws was the RJD’s inability to expand beyond its core Muslim-Yadav base, a critical failure even as Rahul Gandhi’s “Vote Chori Yatra” attempted to energise the Opposition.Also Read | Congress was doomed to fail in Bihar.The problem was a lack of both effort and credibility. While the MGB projected Vikassheel Insaan Party leader Mukesh Sahani as the deputy chief ministerial face to woo EBCs and the Nishad community, the RJD’s ticket distribution told the real story. Despite its rhetoric of inclusion, Yadavs, just 14.3 per cent of the population, were given a disproportionate 37 per cent of the party’s tickets. Meanwhile, EBCs, who form over 36 per cent of Bihar’s population, were overlooked. This strategic misstep proved decisive. Tejashwi Yadav also failed to draw lessons from Akhilesh Yadav’s successful PDA (Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak) outreach in Uttar Pradesh in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, where the SP’s conscious inclusion of non-Yadav OBCs in ticket distribution seemed to have yielded dividends. But by giving disproportionately higher representation to Yadavs, Tejashwi reinforced the perception of RJD as a Yadav-dominated party.This image became the NDA’s most potent weapon. The coalition orchestrated a powerful social counter-revolution by reviving memories of Lalu Prasad’s tenure. For many upper-caste groups, Rajputs, Brahmins, Bhumihars and crucially for non-Yadav backward classes and Dalits, the “social revolution” of the 1990s remains synonymous with the dominance and tyranny of a single caste and the perceived lawlessness of “Jungle Raj.” Those who were young adults during that era are now heads of households, and they seem to narrate those memories to younger family members, urging them not to be swayed by Tejashwi’s modern, urbane image or his promises to end migration and provide government jobs. The NDA skillfully framed the election as a choice between development and stability versus a return to chaos; a narrative that swayed undecided voters and cemented a broad front against the RJD.AdvertisementThe contrast in campaign discipline was equally stark. The NDA started early, dominated the messaging space, and projected cohesion. Nitish Kumar addressed 84 rallies, presenting himself as an administrator of proven competence, impeccable integrity, and an opponent of dynastic politics, qualities that strengthened his appeal, especially among EBCs and women. Despite concerns about his health, the BJP’s decision not to announce him CM candidate and his “palturam” image, he managed to retain a significant reservoir of trust.Tejashwi, meanwhile, entered the field late. The MGB’s campaign was outmanoeuvred at every step. While Tejaswi focused on general anti-incumbency and the government jobs he provided during his 17-month tenure as deputy CM under Kumar, the NDA ran a disciplined campaign centred on its welfare record, the power of a “double engine” government, and fears of a return to “Jungle Raj.” The MGB lacked clarity and failed to articulate a credible alternative.Compounding these electoral missteps were serious tactical failures. The MGB was plagued by internal discord and weak alliance management. The coalition was stitched together late, leading to public disputes over seat-sharing. Vote transfer, critical in a first-past-the-post system, was inconsistent and unreliable. Allies like Mukesh Sahani’s VIP failed to deliver EBC and Nishad votes, while the Congress and Left parties, hollowed out organisationally, added symbolic value but little electoral weight. In contrast, the NDA ensured smooth coordination. The return of the LJP (RV) plugged past vote leakages and consolidated Dalit support, presenting a united front.The electoral system magnified these divides. The NDA’s consolidated 47.2 per cent vote share, compared to the MGB’s 37.3 per cent, translated into a disproportionately large seat share. Spoilers like Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj Party further fragmented the anti-NDA vote, sealing the MGB’s fate.most readThe MGB did not lose merely because the NDA campaigned better. It lost because it failed to grow. The RJD did not redefine its identity or broaden its social outreach. Structural mistrust among large segments of EBCs and non-Yadav OBCs persisted. The NDA only needed to sharpen these existing perceptions.Bihar’s verdict carries a clear message: In a state shaped by layered caste identities and long political memories, power ultimately rests with the coalition that can persuade the widest spectrum of voters that it embodies their future. In Bihar, that coalition was unmistakably the NDA.Politics rooted in a narrow social base, driven by old loyalties, burdened by past failures, and dependent on abstract promises, cannot secure victory against the BJP’s calibrated electoral strategy and its 24×7 campaign machinery.The writer is a professor, DDU Gorakhpur University