THE first Manchester derby of the season turned into a familiar nightmare for United.Pep Guardiola’s clinical City side strolled to a commanding 3-0 victory at the Etihad Stadium and the gulf in class was painfully apparent.AFPErling Haaland celebrates scoring City’s third goal against United[/caption]Shutterstock EditorialRuben Amorim shouts in frustration during the derby defeat[/caption]Ruben Amorim’s men were utterly outplayed and outclassed in a contest that laid bare the deep-rooted issues still plaguing Old Trafford.This latest humbling reopens wounds that never truly healed from last season’s grim campaign, which saw United languish at the wrong end of the table before a heartbreaking Europa League final defeat to Tottenham. Any fleeting optimism, sparked by a goalless draw with Arsenal on the opening weekend, has now completely evaporated, replaced by a familiar sense of dread amongst the travelling faithful.In the aftermath, a defiant Amorim publicly declared he had no intention of abandoning his rigid 3-4-3 formationYet this tactical inflexibility is rapidly becoming the primary concern. Pundits and fans alike are now questioning whether United can ever hope to compete at the highest level while shackled to a system that appears incapable of adapting to superior opposition. As City proved so emphatically, faith in a single plan is a poor substitute for quality and tactical nous.Amorim now has the worst win percentage of any Manchester United manager since World War II.BEST FREE BETS AND BETTING SIGN UP OFFERSAt the moment the Old Trafford board are sticking by him, but for how long?United are poor when pressing high Although Rúben Amorim implements a relatively rigid formation, there is considerable flexibility within his game plan, particularly regarding the team’s high press. When opponents build from the back, United are instructed to alternate between a narrow, man-oriented press and a deeper block designed to cut off passing lanes. In the match against Man City, this tactical flexibility resulted in confusion, leaving them caught between two strategies and enabling City to progress the ball without difficulty.A primary contributor to this issue is the central vulnerability of the 3-4-3 system – it relies heavily on only two central midfielders. Success in this formation is contingent on having powerful, athletic players capable of covering extensive ground. Amorim has the worst record of any Man Utd manager since the WarGettyBenjamin Sesko has cut a frustrated figure at United since his move[/caption]Amorim’s team that lost 3-0 to Man CityThe disjointed look to teh side, which saw Diallo further forward than SeskoAmorim’s choice of Manuel Ugarte and Bruno Fernandes proved suboptimal, as neither possesses the elite physical attributes required for such a demanding role. This personnel mismatch makes it clear why the club was pursuing Brighton’s Carlos Baleba during the summer transfer window.In the instance below, we see how easy City found it to play through United. Bruno Fernandes has jumped high to support the forwards in pressing. The issue is that behind the press United have been left with just one midfielder covering ground. City are then able to play comfortably through the press.Man Utd’s press was poor against City, who found it too easy to pass the ball through gaps in the red wallCity’s 4-3-3 system gave them an immediate advantage, creating a 3v2 overload in the centre of midfield that consistently left a player free. This numerical superiority allowed City to render United’s press ineffective and bypass it with ease. United appeared indecisive, executing neither a high press nor a deep block effectively, thus failing to prevent easy ball progression.Given how established City are in their passing and build-up play, United’s lack of a clear and consistent plan to counter them was evident. This is an area where Amorim’s coaching must bring improvement. A press is only as good as its intensity and the support it receives from midfield; both were lacking in this performance. The team must be coached to be more effective and organised when playing against the ball.A similar story here and once again.City are building deep and United do not have the structure of positioning to prevent City from easily playing through the thirds and breaking forward.Man Utd were powerless to prevent City from passing the ball up the pitchOne of the most immediate improvements Amorim could make to this United squad would be to implement a more effective and consistent pressing structure. However, the Portuguese coach appears reluctant to commit to a single, clear strategy.He is leaving his team caught between different approaches when trying to stop opponents building from the back.Midfield is overloaded too easilyUnder Amorim, United’s consistent use of a 3-4-3 formation creates a persistent structural problem – a 2v3 numerical disadvantage in central midfield against most opponents. This midfield overload is paradoxically paired with a 3v1 surplus in defence against a lone striker. Critically, the team lacks a clear on-field mechanism to use this spare defender to negate the midfield deficit, leaving significant gaps for the opposition to exploit.Post-match comments from Bruno Fernandes revealed the intended solution against City. The plan required Fernandes to push higher to press Rodri, which in turn should have triggered a centre-back, Lenny Yoro, to step out of the defensive line to cover the free midfielder. In practice, however, this defensive rotation was not executed, allowing City to consistently break the press and advance into dangerous areas with ease.In this example, we see Rodri in possession deep, pulling the press towards him. United are too narrow in their midfield and this is not helped by Jeremy Doku shifting in from the left-side to receive the pass to play through the press.Bruno Fernandes is still Man Utd’s key manFive Man Utd players try to press but they are too narrow and lack mobilityUnited’s midfield was again undone by its lack of athleticism. When either Ugarte or Fernandes pressed high, they couldn’t recover their position, leaving central areas exposed. This is precisely the space where Phil Foden operated, repeatedly collecting the ball between the lines before turning to run at a vulnerable United defence.In this example, Fernandes is pressing higher onto Rodri and leaves spaces left behind for City to exploit. Foden exploits the space left by Bruno FernandesAlthough Yoro is positioned ‘close’ to Foden he is not tight enough to really make an impact on the ball.To counter the opposition’s midfield overload, United needs a clear tactical adjustment. Two viable solutions present themselves: the striker could drop deeper to mark the opposition’s holding midfielder (like Rodri), or a specific central defender could be instructed to step up into the midfield zone. However, both options require a tactical compromise — either reducing the team’s attacking threat or altering the defensive structure — which may be a step Amorim is currently unwilling to take.How will United create chances?Since joining Manchester United in 2020, Bruno Fernandes has been the club’s most consistent and influential attacking creator. This season, however, significant investment in attackers like Bryan Mbeumo and Matheus Cunha has prompted his move into a deeper central midfield role.There is a clear tactical rationale for this shift; as the team’s best passer and ball progressor, Fernandes can theoretically build play and advance the team from deep. Bruno Fernandes is key to Man Utd’s attacking creativityThe flaw in this approach, however, is that it overlooks the considerable defensive responsibilities inherent in the position.It simply does not align with his primary strengths.The problem that we have seen from Fernandes playing deeper, however, is that he generally takes the ball in positions where he cannot hurt teams with his aggressive passing. If teams drop deep and deny United space then the team’s best creative passer is confined to an area where he cannot access the penalty area or find angles to really play teammates through into attacking areas.Bruno Fernandes is on the ball but is far too deepAgainst City last weekend, United’s chance creation was one-dimensional and ineffective. They relied heavily on crosses from advanced fullbacks, but this approach proved fruitless as deliveries repeatedly failed to beat the first defender. A more potent strategy would involve getting Bruno Fernandes on the ball in the final third, where he can operate in the channels and play passes behind the defensive line.This, however, would require a tactical adjustment. Shifting to a three-man midfield and using Fernandes as a No 8 would allow him to collect the ball deep while also granting him the freedom to advance into areas where he is most dangerous. The problem, once again, is Amorim’s tactical inflexibility and reluctance to deviate from his preferred system.Amorim’s tactical inflexibility mean Amad and Mbeumo have dropped deep and narrowIn this example, Fernandes is very deep as he takes the ball and finds Mbuemo in his own half. The two attacking midfielders, Mbuemo and Amad, are deep and narrow while the wingbacks are more advanced. Mbuemo plays a short pass across as opposed to driving into the space ahead of him. In these positions you would hope to see Fernandes be more aggressive with the ball.ConclusionAmorim’s post-match declaration that he would not change his system felt less like a statement of principle and more like a direct challenge to the United board. The reality is that his 3-4-3 formation has now been exposed and countered by too many Premier League managers to be a foundation for consistent success.If United are serious about returning to the top, Amorim’s refusal to adapt surely means his time at the club is nearing its end.