The US and Israel’s military strikes on Iran beginning Saturday (February 28), which prompted the latter to respond with a barrage of missiles and drones across West Asia, drew reactions from other countries that were mostly skewed against Iran. But among those who condemned the US-Israeli action, one stood out: Turkey.Earlier this week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had called the US-Israel attacks on Iran a “clear violation of international law”. He also said he was “deeply saddened” by the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the strikes, and added that the US-Iran war had broken out following provocations by Israel.A day later, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attempted to position Turkey as a key player in terms of working towards de-escalation and a return to the negotiating table. He told media persons that the country was “sensitively carrying out necessary initiatives with all our counterparts” to achieve peace in the region, and that it was critical to preserve the stability of Iran and the region.On Wednesday, Reuters reported that a ballistic missile fired from Iran and headed towards Turkish airspace had been destroyed by NATO air and missile defence systems. While there were no casualties or injuries, the incident marked the first time that Turkey, a NATO member and Iran’s northwestern neighbour, would be drawn into the ongoing conflict.Sharing a 534-km border, Turkey and Iran have historically had complex ties, and the two countries have often been on opposing sides of conflicts and proxy wars that have recently played out in West Asia. Erdogan has also reportedly forged a close relationship with US President Donald Trump over the years.So, what explains Turkey’s stance towards Iran? We look at the history of bilateral ties and what governs the Turkish geopolitical playbook.From imperial rivalry to secular dictatorsAlthough the Turkey-Iran rivalry in the 21st century has often evoked comparisons with the battle of dominance between the Ottoman (Turkey) and Safavid (Iran) imperial systems throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, many historians go further back in dating the history of the two regions.Story continues below this adIn a research paper on Turkey-Iran relations, Ankara-based academic Bayram Sinkaya writes that the two peoples knew each other much before the Turkic tribes migrated into Asia Minor (now Anatolia, a large peninsula in West Asia constituting most of modern-day Turkey). This gradually evolved into the emergence of a “Turco-Iranian civilisation” that spread across West Asia between the 10th and 13th centuries. But this cultural synthesis gradually faded away with Ottomans marching westward, whereas the Safavids strove to craft a distinctive sectarian identity in their dominions.Although the Ottoman-Safavid military conflicts shaped general perceptions on their relations, Sinkaya states that it did not prevent cultural transactions between the two. Moreover, both administrations were heavily influenced by each other in terms of political and military organisation, and their diplomatic exchanges, including gifts in peacetime, showed the close affinity between them.The military and economic advances of the Western colonial powers in the 19th century eventually forced both countries to begin the process of modernisation. The latter half of the century, Sinkaya writes, saw “intensive intellectual, political and economic exchanges between the two countries… besides a growing affinity between political dissidents of the two monarchies that supported constitutionalist movements in both countries.”During World War I (1914-18), both Ottoman-ruled Turkey and Iran (then ruled by the Qajar dynasty) either sided with or were sympathetic to the Germany-led Central Powers. But with the defeat of the Central Powers at the hands of the Allied Powers, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated whereas the Qajar regime also collapsed. This led to the rise of modern, Western-oriented nation-states in Turkey (under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) and Iran (under Reza Shah Pahlavi), modelled on principles of secularism.Story continues below this adAlthough the 20th century also saw the rise of ethnonationalist sentiments — prominently in the case of the “Iranian Turks” and the Kurdish militants — the two countries maintained friendly relations right until Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, which ousted the Pahlavis and ushered the Ayatollah Khomeini-led clerical regime to power.A turning pointUntil then, both Turkey and Iran had been part of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), the US-led military alliance during the Cold War. After the Revolution, the new Iranian leadership withdrew the country from CENTO and reversed the Pahlavi-era “reforms” towards secularism and Westernisation.In the meantime, Turkey witnessed a military coup in 1980 and the new regime drew even closer to the US, which Iran perceived as a threat. Bilateral relations were further complicated by Khomeini’s call for neighbouring nations to revolt against US-backed despotic regimes and establish Islamic governments, which alarmed rulers in the region — including Turkey, which was already dealing with the rise of Islamic militants with sympathies towards the Iranian revolution.But economic motivations prevailed throughout the 1980s and for most of the 1990s. Despite ideological tensions and diplomatic crises that cropped up from time to time, both countries attempted to prioritise stability and territorial integrity.Story continues below this adIn 2002, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party came to power, an event that marked a turning point not just in Turkish domestic politics but foreign policy as well. From being solidly anchored to the West, the new regime embarked on an outreach towards countries in West Asia as part of a “multi-dimensional and pro-active foreign policy”, which Sinkaya cites as having triggered a debate over a “shift of axis”. This shift was all the more evident when Turkey, in its capacity as the temporary seat holder in the UN Security Council, opposed a new round of UN sanctions targeting Iran in June 2010, going against its traditional Western allies.In an April 2025 piece for the think-tank Chatham House, Sanam Vakil and Galip Dalay indicated that Turkey’s approach to its neighbourhood can be best understood in its support for a “regional order shaped by regional powers’ interests rather than the policies of external actors, such as the US and China”. Pointing to Turkish support for connectivity projects rooted in regional ownership, they wrote: “Unlike Iran, Ankara does not altogether oppose the US’s role and presence in the region. However, it rejects what it sees as the US’s Israel-centric view of the regional order, and has voiced its opposition to US-supported initiatives… which in Turkey’s view are based on a strategy of containment and exclusion.”Writing for the Washington, DC-based think-tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, senior fellow Sinan Ciddi highlighted Turkey’s long-standing preference for the survival of Iran’s Islamist regime, citing Ankara’s refusal to criticise Tehran over its brutal crackdown of the protests that broke out in December 2025 and January 2026.Calling Ankara’s objective “strategic”, he wrote: “A weakened but intact Islamist regime in Tehran better serves Erdogan’s regional ambitions than a democratic Iran aligned with the West. The Islamic Republic’s survival ensures the continued operation of its terrorist proxy network — including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza — which directly targets Israel. This aligns with Erdogan’s sustained hostility toward Israel.”The Israel angleStory continues below this adIran firing a ballistic missile into Turkish airspace on Wednesday risks expanding the theatre of conflict. Arif Keskin, an Iran expert at Ankara University, told AFP that any attack on Turkey would constitute a “high-stakes strategic gamble” on Iran’s part, and could push the conflict “beyond manageable limits”.While the Turkish defence ministry issued a statement warning against actions that could lead to further escalation of conflict and said it would “continue to consult with NATO and… other allies”, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters in a briefing Wednesday that Iran’s action against Turkey was unlikely to “trigger anything like Article 5”. Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty stipulates the collective-defence clause: an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.Besides being drawn into an all-out war, Turkey has its share of challenges. Writing for Arab News, Turkish political analyst Sinem Cengiz listed refugee inflows as a major risk. Already host to millions of refugees who escaped Syria during the civil war (2011-24), the risk of a prolonged conflict directly involving Iran would place further economic and political pressure on the Erdogan-led government.More importantly, Cengiz mentions the risk of a civil war in Iran leading to regional instability, saying that a weakened Iran “may create a security vacuum”. Disagreeing with the contention that this might create geopolitical space for Turkey to expand its regional influence, Cengiz framed the Turkish-Iranian rivalry as “competitive” and not existential, and added that over time, both sides had compartmentalised differences and avoided direct confrontation.Story continues below this adEven as things continue to unfold in Iran, the stage looks set for the next chapter in the Turkish-Israeli contest. In a short analysis for the think-tank Brookings, Turkish political commentator Aslı Aydıntaşbaş wrote that “this war is sharpening the enmity between Turkey and Israel, pushing them closer to a long-term collision”.According to her, even if Turkey stays out of the war, it will have to manage its rivalry with Israel, which has already intensified over Gaza and Syria. Saying that it “prefers the Iran it knows to a postwar order shaped more decisively by Israel”, she wrote that Israel’s broader pursuit for “a Middle East reorganized around Israeli military primacy” will inevitably clash with Turkey’s own interests and quest for regional influence.