PETER W. KLEIN2026年3月5日“Take over your government,” President Trump urged Iranians as bombs began raining down this past weekend. “It will be yours to take. This will be, probably, your only chance for generations.” It was a stirring call, drawing on the dream of democracy and the promise of liberation. The United States has issued it to other nations many times in the past, and it tends to end in disaster. “接管你们的政府，”上周末炮火如雨点般落下时，特朗普总统向伊朗人民发出了号召。“它将由你们主宰。这可能是你们几代人中唯一的机会。”这是一个激动人心的号召，利用了民主的梦想和解放的承诺。美国在过去曾多次向其他国家发出这种号召，而结果往往以灾难告终。During the Cold War, Radio Free Europe broadcasts encouraged the people of Hungary — my parents among them — to rise up, offering guidance on tactics and strategies and leading many listeners to believe they would receive U.S. military assistance. On Oct. 23, 1956, Hungarians took to the streets, publicly lynching officers of the Communist secret police. A new government formed, under Imre Nagy, and announced that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact. 冷战期间，“自由欧洲电台”的广播鼓励匈牙利人民——其中也包括我的父母——发起起义，并提供战术和策略上的指导，这让许多听众相信他们会得到美国的军事援助。1956年10月23日，匈牙利人走上街头，对共产主义秘密警察进行公开处刑。伊姆雷·纳吉组建了新政府，并宣布匈牙利将退出华沙条约组织。Western help never came. Russian tanks rolled in. My parents watched soldiers open fire on a busy square. Between 2,500 and 3,000 Hungarians were killed during the Soviet crackdown. Tens of thousands were arrested, including Nagy, who was later executed. 然而，西方的援助始终没有到来。苏联的坦克开进了城。我的父母亲眼目睹了士兵在人头攒动的广场开火。在苏联的镇压行动中，约有2500至3000名匈牙利人丧生。数万人被捕，其中包括后来被处决的纳吉。Something similar played out in 1961, as Cuban exiles prepared to invade their homeland and overthrow Fidel Castro, with the promise of U.S. air cover. The military support failed to materialize. More than 100 rebel combatants were killed at the Bay of Pigs, more than 1,000 were captured, and Castro emerged stronger — emboldened in ways that set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis 18 months later. 1961年，类似的一幕再次上演。古巴流亡分子在得到美国提供空中支援的承诺后，准备攻入他们的祖国并推翻菲德尔·卡斯特罗。但军事支持并未兑现。在猪湾事件中，100多名叛军被杀，上千人被俘，卡斯特罗反而变得更加强大——这种底气为18个月后的古巴导弹危机埋下伏笔。We saw it again in the 1980s, when the United States funded and armed Afghan mujahedeen in their war against Soviet occupation. This time American support of revolutionaries did initially succeed. The Soviets withdrew in 1989 — but so did American support. What followed was a civil war, the rise of the Taliban, the radicalization of mujahedeen like Osama bin Laden and eventually 20 years of American war. 到了20世纪80年代，我们再次看到了这种情况。当时美国资助并武装了阿富汗圣战者，支持他们反抗苏联占领。这一次，美国对革命者的支持起初确实取得了成功。苏联于1989年撤军，但美国的后续支持也随之消失。接踵而至的是内战、塔利班的崛起、像奥萨马·本·拉登这样的圣战分子的激进化，以及最终长达20年的阿富汗战争。In 1991, after Operation Desert Storm drove Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on Iraqis to “take matters into their own hands — to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” Iraq’s Shiite majority rose up in rebellion, driving Baathist forces out of the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Within days, Saddam’s Republican Guard regained the upper hand. Army forces rounded up rebels, torturing, raping and murdering them in Shiite mosques, or using helicopters to pour kerosene on them and set them on fire. Washington decided not to intervene. Tens of thousands died. 1991年，在“沙漠风暴行动”将萨达姆·侯赛因的军队赶出科威特之后，老布什总统呼吁伊拉克人“采取行动——迫使独裁者萨达姆·侯赛因下台”。占人口多数的伊拉克什叶派发起反抗，将复兴党军队赶出了圣城纳杰夫和卡尔巴拉。然而几天之内，萨达姆的共和国卫队就重新占据了上风。政府军围捕了反叛者，在什叶派清真寺内对他们进行折磨、强奸和杀戮，甚至用直升机向他们泼洒煤油并点火。华盛顿最终决定不干预。成千上万人丧生。In all of these instances, the body count tells only part of the story. A bitter sense of betrayal lasts for generations. In 2003, two decades after Washington abandoned those Shiite rebels in Iraq, my “60 Minutes” colleague Bob Simon and I sat down with Muqtada al-Sadr, then a young Shiite cleric, in Najaf, which was at the heart of Saddam’s 1991 crackdown. We asked him whether he was thankful that the United States had at last toppled Iraqi Shiites’ oppressor. With the first gulf war still fresh in his mind, he replied, “The little serpent has left, and the great serpent has come.” 在所有这些案例中，伤亡人数只说明了部分问题。痛苦的背叛感会持续几代人。2003年，在华盛顿抛弃伊拉克什叶派反叛者的20年后，我和《60分钟》的同事鲍勃·西蒙在纳杰夫采访了当时的年轻什叶派教士穆克塔达·萨德尔，那里曾是1991年萨达姆镇压行动的核心地带。我们问他是否感谢美国终于推翻了压迫伊拉克什叶派的人。由于第一次海湾战争的记忆依然鲜活，他回答道：“小蛇走了，大蛇来了。”Authoritarian regimes rarely just collapse. With everything on the line, they fight back, often brutally. That’s why real regime change takes more than just the removal of an individual leader. It takes weapons, logistics and intelligence. It takes time and money and American lives. Too often, presidents talk a big game at the outset but reassess their priorities when the costs become clear.威权政权很少会自行崩溃。当生死存亡受到威胁时，他们会反击，而且往往极其残暴。这就是为什么真正的政权更迭不仅仅是撤换一个领导人那么简单。它需要武器、后勤和情报，需要时间、金钱以及美国人的生命。太多的总统在起初夸夸其谈，但在成本变得清晰后就开始重新评估其优先级。What gets left out of that reassessment are the people who believed the promises. The Hungarians who took to the streets of Budapest. The Iraqi Shiites who seized control of their cities. The Cuban exiles who waded ashore. 而在重新评估中被忽略掉的，是那些相信了诺言的人：那些走上布达佩斯街头的匈牙利人，那些夺取城市控制权的伊拉克什叶派，那些涉水上岸的古巴流亡者。In the case of Iran today, the obstacles are especially daunting. While the majority of Iranians oppose their nation’s ruling regime, there is no clear, organized movement with recognized leadership to lead them out of it. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is large, powerful and brutal, More than 6,800 civilians died during the recent protests against the regime, according to a U.S.-based human rights group. Some estimates are many times higher. 就今天的伊朗而言，困难尤为艰巨。虽然多数伊朗人反对该国的统治政权，但目前还没有一个明确的、拥有公认领导层的组织化运动来领导他们。伊斯兰革命卫队规模庞大、势力雄厚且手段残忍。据一家总部位于美国的民权组织称，在近期反对该政权的抗议活动中，已有超过6800名平民死亡。有些估计甚至比这还要高出许多倍。Numerous military analysts say that without the arrival of weapons or ground troops, Iran’s rebels have little hope of success. In addition, many Iranians are skeptical of America’s intentions, and mindful of the last time this country effected regime change in Iran — in 1953, when the C.I.A. helped to overthrow a democratically elected leader and returned the shah to power. 许多军事分析人士表示，如果没有武器或地面部队的进入，伊朗反抗者成功的希望渺茫。此外，许多伊朗人对美国的意图持怀疑态度，并对美国上一次在伊朗策划政权更迭记忆犹新——那是1953年，中情局协助推翻了一位民主选举产生的领导人，并将巴列维国王重新扶上王位。If a popular uprising did succeed, internal divisions could cause the nation to fracture, creating the kind of power vacuum that has derailed U.S. interests before in places such as Baghdad and Kabul — this time with a country potentially on the brink of developing nuclear weapons. 即使民众起义取得成功，内部的分歧也可能导致国家分裂，制造出那种曾在巴格达和喀布尔挫败美国利益的权力真空——而这一次，面对的是一个可能即将拥有核武器的国家。Watching the violent crackdown on protesters in Tehran reminded me of scenes that my parents described in Budapest in 1956. Without overt U.S. intervention, it took more than three decades for Soviet control to end there. Will the United States stick around now to support the Iranians it is goading into a dangerous uprising? Or will it achieve its military goals and move on? 看着德黑兰对抗议者的暴力镇压，让我想起了父母描述的1956年布达佩斯的场景。没有美国的公开干预，苏联在那里的统治花了30多年才结束。美国现在会留下来，支持它正在怂恿参与危险起义的伊朗人吗？还是在实现其军事目标后就扬长而去？The rhetoric of liberation is cheap, whereas the cost of actually delivering on it is not. The people who believe the promises are the ones who bear the price. That has been true across nearly a century of American foreign policy. Before Iranians bet their lives on the United States’ commitment, they deserve to know the odds. “解放”的辞令是廉价的，而实现它的代价却极其昂贵。那些相信承诺的人，才是付出代价的人。这在近一个世纪的美国外交政策中屡试不爽。在伊朗人把性命押在美国的承诺上之前，他们理应知道胜算几何。图片中影像来源：Amr Alfiky/Reuters, Mirrorpix/Getty Images and Universal Images Group, via Getty ImagesPeter W. Klein因是一位曾获艾美奖的调查记者和影片制作人。他是英属哥伦比亚大学全球报道中心的创始人之一，并在那里担任新闻学教授。翻译：纽约时报中文网点击查看本文英文版。获取更多RSS：https://feedx.net https://feedx.site