The war in West Asia has now entered its 18th day. Both the US and Israel are continuing their bombardment of Iran, with one of the most recent strikes on Tuesday allegedly taking out Iran’s top security official, Ali Larijani.But Iran does not appear to be backing down. The scale of its response since February 28 — the escalation of the war to Gulf Arab countries — has “shocked” President Donald Trump and raised questions about Washington’s strategic objectives.In the first week of the war, Tehran rejected the possibility of a ceasefire. And, in the second, it imposed its own demands on Washington — recognition of its “legitimate rights, payment of reparations, and firm international guarantees against future aggression”. Gen Mohsen Rezaee, the adviser to new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, has said the latter’s guarantees can only be met by an American military withdrawal from the region.This is a far cry from the face-saving positions Iran has adopted in previous conflicts, especially the 12-day war in June 2025. So what has enabled this new Iranian position? And what could be its likely outcome?What is Iran aiming to do with this war?Let’s put this war aside for the moment. Iran faced unprecedented direct Israeli military action in April and October 2024, and US-Israeli action in June 2025.In those instances, it was in Tehran’s interest to de-escalate and seek swift off-ramps — amid domestic weaknesses, loss of nuclear enrichment capabilities and weakened non-state allies (the Axis of Resistance). Iran was also unable to deter these repeated attacks.With the latest attack, however, Iran adopted a new position. It would not rely on symbolic face-savers while avoiding war, but deploy the entire range of its asymmetric arsenal — drone and missile-based retaliation, horizontal escalation against all the Gulf states and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.Story continues below this adAlso Read | US assets are under Iran attack, but here’s why NATO doesn’t have to answer Trump’s callAdditionally, the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also left Iran with little to lose and much to gain. This, too, explains the scale of its escalation.Iran’s success in punitive retaliation across two weeks has bolstered this logic, despite the lack of effective defences against US-Israeli strikes that have led to a high number of casualties — the most recent one could be Larijani.Hence, “winning” would now have to not only end the US-Israeli bombardment, but also to force the outcomes which negotiations with the US failed to generate. The war has, therefore, become Iran’s negotiating table. This also means that even if President Trump seeks an off-ramp by unilaterally declaring victory, Tehran can theoretically continue its punitive actions.Finally, searching for a decisive defeat of US-Israeli forces could arguably help Iran deter Israel from “mowing the lawn” — a strategy in which Israel mounts periodic operations to keep the adversary weakened.Story continues below this adWhat has enabled the Iranian response?Khamenei’s assassination has had crucial military and political effects that have brought Iran to this posture.Militarily, it triggered Iran’s mosaic defence framework under which provincial commanders are given autonomy to preserve command and control despite leadership decapitation.Politically, the symbolic nature of Khamenei’s death — “martyrdom” instead of a natural death — has cushioned the transition process that could have otherwise been a vulnerable moment for the Islamic Republic after years of economic hardship and popular unrest.The present wartime nationalism has also enabled the election of Ali Khamenei’s son. Mojtaba Khamenei had no governing experience, lacked scholarly credentials and was a misfit in a system where two successive Supreme Leaders issued diktats against hereditary succession (since the 1979 revolution toppled a monarchy).Story continues below this adBut this elevation has allowed the Iranian system to keep itself intact, with the administration run by a coterie of senior officials backed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.Moreover, Iran has learnt crucial lessons from the Houthis’ Red Sea campaign in imposing international costs for a localised war — the US has now spent more than $12 billion, while the world faces an energy crisis from the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.Iran’s non-state allies are also boosting its bargaining position. Lebanon’s Hezbollah is now engaged in an active front with Israel, and specific units from the Iraqi militia network Hashd ash-Shaabi are helping Tehran strike US bases in Iraq. Crucially, the Houthis (who have expressed their intentions to potentially join this war) are arguably being held in reserve. This leverage allows the Iranian Axis to effectively threaten both the Strait of Hormuz as well as the Bab-el-Mandeb — the narrow maritime chokepoint off Yemen.Also Read | Why Iran differs from Ukraine in terms of economic fallout for India and the worldThis second blockade could disrupt non-oil shipping too, forcing a repeat of 2024 when Houthi bombardment forced ships to go all the way around the Cape of Good Hope.Story continues below this adSo what does an end to the war look like?Regardless of Tehran’s confidence in its posture and Washington’s shifting war aims, both would be aware of the battlefield arithmetic — a countdown between Iranian missiles-drones and US-Israel-Arab interceptors.Outlasting Iran’s drones and missiles alone does not guarantee a victory for the US and Israel. Tehran can continue threatening the Strait of Hormuz for months. And its success in preventing a forced change of government has left it as a weakened but intact adversary.Iran, however, may not wish for the conflict to head into the scorched earth direction, especially considering Washington’s firepower. So it could potentially dilute its maximalist aims and focus on achievable outcomes — such as the continued right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, no irreversible caps on its ballistic missile programme and wide-ranging sanctions relief.Story continues below this adIran will also know better than to expect US reparations or withdrawal.Ultimately, Tehran’s maximalist positions leave it enough room to show a climbdown to Washington in the future, should it be deemed necessary.Bashir Ali Abbas is Senior Research Associate, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi