As West Bengal moves toward the 2026 Legislative Assembly elections, the political landscape has evolved far beyond a simple contest between ideologies. It has become a battle over the “liquid state”, where governance is a performance of cultural identity and a transactional exchange of welfare for political stability.To understand the upcoming mandate, one must look at the twelve structural pillars that now uphold the Trinamool Congress’s (TMC) hegemony and define the challenges of a fragmented Opposition.The Porous, Liquid, and Transactional StateAdvertisementTMC’s organisation is best described as “liquid” — a horizontally networked entity that thrives by being porous. Unlike the rigid, vertical hierarchy of the former Left Front, the TMC functions as an expansive guild that absorbs local power players, regardless of their past ideological affiliations. This fluidity allows the partymen to act as the primary arbiter of access to resources within the state, ranging from state-led service delivery to construction materials for building a house.Also Read | Secular TMC vs communal BJP — the Bengali voter is trapped in a political binary. It is time to move onHere, loyalty is not ideological but functional, and partymen work as the primary gatekeepers. This is most prominently manifested in the formal exchanges between the state and clubs during Durga Puja and informal control mechanisms exercised by clubs.The Doctrine of Inclusive IllegalitiesA core pillar of the TMC’s dominance is “inclusive illegalities”. The party-state has institutionalised a system where the informal and the extralegal — from construction “syndicates” to unregulated neighborhood clubs — are legitimate nodes of authority. These neighborhood para clubs receive direct financial grants, electricity discounts, and tax waivers, effectively acting as de facto administrative arms.AdvertisementFrom sand to land, from apartment housing to informal sector employment, all are part of this new form of entrepreneurial endeavour that feeds many livelihoods and creates relatively fluid transactional networks.The Production of ViolencePolitical violence in West Bengal is not merely an outburst of passion but a manufactured “intra-systemic” process used to maintain power relations within a democratic system. This violence is characterised by a “fluidity of agents” where roles shift as political circumstances evolve — such as former combatants being repurposed into local political associates.This “everyday form of violence” becomes strategic during elections, used to engineer uncontested elections where opposition candidates are forced to withdraw through threats or kidnappings.Faith as a State-sponsored PerformanceTo counter the BJP’s Hindutva, the TMC has deployed “cultural misrecognition”, in which faith is treated as a state-sponsored performance. This involves investing taxpayers’ money into massive replicas of religious landmarks to simulate history and tradition.The Digha Jagannath Temple is a prime example of this act. With such endeavours, the TMC blunts the BJP’s “anti-Hindu” narrative while stimulating the state’s informal economy through religious tourism.Institutionalisation of ‘Asmita’Building on the Digha project, the state launched “Durga Angan” in New Town, a permanent courtyard for the daily worship of Ma Durga costing Rs 262 crore. This move centralises “Bengali Asmita” (regional pride) within the state’s administrative reach, framing the TMC as the permanent custodian of Bengal’s primary cultural icon.Moreover, this institutionalisation is perhaps one of the first systematic attempts to transform an intangible culture into a tangible entity.SIR BacklashThe 2026 election is likely to be significantly impacted by the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, which saw the removal of over 58 lakh names. The TMC has framed the SIR as a “citizenship survey” intended to disenfranchise minority voters, inducing a “trust deficit” between citizens and the state.The backlash included a “dead man walking” protest where a TMC councillor declared dead on the rolls, demanded his own last rites at a crematorium. Further, the SIR exercise has made the Matua community, once BJP’s close ally, turn against it. This is expected to significantly impact the BJP in terms of its electoral losses.BJP’s Cultural DeficitThe BJP continues to struggle with “cultural misrecognition,” as its pan-Indian Hindutva narrative often fails to resonate with the specific cultural idioms of Bengal. TMC’s Bohiragoto (outsider) tag frames the BJP as a Hindi-heartland force attempting to impose a monolithic culture.While the BJP has gained vote share among Matuas and Rajbanshis, its inability to produce a culturally indigenous leadership remains a strategic bottleneck.The Left’s DescentThe Left Front enters the 2026 cycle in a state of strategic confusion, punctuated by engagements with Humayun Kabir, a suspended TMC MLA who recently founded the Janata Unnayan Party (JUP). Kabir’s decision to build a “Babri Masjid-style” replica in Murshidabad signals a shift toward confrontational identity politics that the Left seems unprepared to navigate.Flirting with such divisive figures risks alienating the Left’s secular base without securing the minority vote, which remains largely tied to the TMC’s welfare safety net.Welfarism as Political GrammarThe TMC’s dominance is anchored in a “welfare-front-loaded” political grammar. The flagship Lakshmir Bhandar scheme, providing income support to 2.21 crore women, has been hiked to Rs 1,500 and Rs 1,700. Additionally, the “Banglar Yuva Sathi” scheme offers Rs 1,500 monthly to educated unemployed youth, creating a vast cohort of “beneficiary citizens”.This model turns elections into a “referendum on gratitude”, prioritising cash transfers over structural industrial development.Fish and Meat PoliticsFood has become a marker of cultural identity and political resistance in Bengal. The TMC capitalised on the Bihar government’s ban on open-air meat sales by claiming a BJP victory in Bengal would lead to a ban on fish and meat.Framing this as “plate policing”, the TMC successfully invoked the machhe-bhaate Bangali (fish-eating Bengali) stereotype to label the BJP as “anti-Bengali”.The Bangladesh FactorThe landslide victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in February 2026 has introduced regional instability as a campaign theme. The surge in “India Out” rhetoric and concerns over minority safety across the border have allowed the BJP to raise security alarms regarding the “Chicken’s Neck” corridor.Conversely, the harassment of Bengali-speaking migrants within India provides the TMC with a handle to target the Centre for being discriminatory against Bengalis.The 2026 election represents a referendum on the sustainability of the “liquid state.” The TMC’s ability to maintain a transactional peace through inclusive illegalities, while invoking a regional cultural identity, makes it a difficult fortress to storm.For the Opposition, the challenge is not just ideological but cultural: They must dismantle the “Bohiragoto” barrier and produce a narrative that is both materially promising and indigenous to the Bengali soul.The writer is a political anthropologist and teaches at Government General Degree College, Keshiary, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal