JING QIAN, NEIL THOMAS2026年3月23日 Andy Wong/Associated PressPresident Trump has postponed his visit to China by several weeks, blaming the U.S.-Israel war with Iran. The trip, which could help stabilize the U.S. relationship with Beijing and revive wider exchanges, should not be allowed to slide indefinitely.特朗普总统已将其访华行程推迟数周，理由是美国与以色列对伊朗的战争。此次访问本有助于稳定美中关系、重启两国更广泛的交流，它不应无限期拖延下去。Washington needs to restore regular travel by American policymakers to China, which dropped sharply in recent years, just as the economic and geopolitical competition between the two countries has intensified.华盛顿需要恢复美国政策制定者对华的常态化出访——近年来这类出访大幅减少，而美中之间的经济与地缘政治竞争却在加剧。No American president has set foot in China since Mr. Trump did in 2017, during his first term. That absence highlights a simple but troubling truth: Americans talk incessantly about the need to compete with their country’s greatest rival and how to do it. Yet many U.S. policymakers have never been to China.自特朗普2017年首次任期内访华后，再无美国总统踏足中国。这一空白凸显了一个简单却令人不安的事实：美国人无休止地讨论着必须与这个最大的对手竞争，以及如何竞争，却有许多美国政策制定者从未去过中国。U.S. officials are left grappling with an abstraction. This can lead to serious misjudgments, such as the escalating tariffs Mr. Trump imposed last year, expecting they would bring China to its knees. In the end, he retreated after Beijing showed it had the tools and capacity to push back.美国官员只能对着一个抽象概念，这极易导致严重误判。比如特朗普去年不断升级的关税措施，本以为能让中国屈服，最终却在中国展现出反制能力与手段后不得不退让。Seeing China up close — its manufacturing juggernaut, technological and innovative capacities, state-of-the-art infrastructure and state-fostered industrial ecosystems — would help prevent such miscalculations and hopefully lead to U.S. policy that is less complacent, less theatrical and more focused on what’s actually needed to revitalize American industry.近距离观察中国——它的制造业巨头、科技创新实力、最先进的基础设施，以及国家培育的产业生态——有助于避免此类误判，也有望让美国政策少些自满、少些作秀，更聚焦于振兴美国产业的实际所需。Congressional travel to China used to be routine. According to data compiled by the scholar Scott Kennedy, 177 U.S. lawmakers took part in 59 congressional delegations to China from 2010 to 2019. Such exchanges have essentially stopped since 2020. Likewise, American presidents since Ronald Reagan had gone to China at least once during their terms, but that ended with Joe Biden, who never visited as president.国会议员访华曾是常态。学者甘思德(Scott Kennedy)汇编的数据显示，2010至2019年间，共有177名美国议员参与59个国会代表团访华。这类交流自2020年起基本停滞。同样，自里根以来的历任美国总统在任期内至少访华一次，但这一惯例在拜登任内被打破，他从未以总统身份访华。This matters more than you might think. Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972 ended decades of estrangement, and subsequent congressional delegations contributed to the normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979. Cold War-era visits to the Soviet Union — by presidents and members of Congress — were crucial in helping the United States gather information, manage tensions and sustain dialogue on crucial issues such as arms control.这一点的重要性远超想象。1972年尼克松访华结束了两国数十年的隔绝，后续国会代表团的访问推动了1979年美中关系正常化。冷战时期，历任总统与国会议员对苏联的出访对于帮助美国搜集信息、管控紧张局势、维持军控等关键议题对话至关重要。Official travel to China was cut off by the pandemic and has yet to recover, because of factors such as tighter government control over Chinese society, Beijing’s experiment with a more combative so-called wolf warrior diplomacy a few years ago and mounting tension between the two countries. China’s periodic imposition of exit bans on U.S. citizens and the imposition of sanctions on government officials on both sides have further chilled the atmosphere. China became toxic in Washington; visiting there risked inviting a political backlash. The political climate has also sharply curtailed the number of Americans going to China for tourism, study and scholarly exchange.疫情切断了官方对华出访，至今仍未恢复，背后原因包括中国社会受到政府更严格的管控、前几年北京推行更具对抗性的所谓战狼外交，以及两国紧张局势不断升级。中国不时对美国公民实施出境禁令、双方相互制裁政府官员，进一步让两国氛围趋于冷淡。中国在华盛顿成了“毒药”，访华可能招致政治反噬。这种政治气候也大幅削减了美国民众赴华旅游、留学与学术交流的数量。This situation does not serve American interests. Seeing China as it is will help the United States judge where to compete with China, where to cooperate and how to strengthen its own foundations.这种局面不符合美国利益。看清真实的中国才有助于美国判断在哪些领域与中国竞争、在哪些领域与中国合作，以及如何夯实自身根基。To restore American competitiveness, Congress in 2022 passed the CHIPS and Science Act to boost U.S. semiconductor manufacturing and the Inflation Reduction Act, with its support for renewables, electric vehicles and battery supply chains. But much more needs to be done to build U.S. engineering talent, its power infrastructure and industrial base to compete long term with China’s scale and dynamism.为恢复美国竞争力，国会于2022年通过《芯片与科学法案》以提振美国半导体制造，通过《通胀削减法案》支持可再生能源、电动汽车与电池供应链。但要长期抗衡中国的规模与活力，美国在工程人才培养、电力基础设施建设与产业基础打造上仍需付出更多努力。That becomes clear when you see firsthand the modernity of China’s factories, the expertise of its scientists and technologists and the integrated production ecosystems behind its world-beating battery, electric vehicle and biotechnology sectors and other industries of the future.亲眼目睹中国工厂的现代化程度、科学家与技术人员的专业能力，以及其领先全球的电池、电动汽车、生物技术等未来产业背后的一体化生产生态系统之后，就会明白这一点。We regularly travel to China and often brief policymakers in Washington about what we’ve seen. They lean in most when we describe our recent conversations with leaders and experts in China about how its system works and the internal debates and competing interests behind the state media headlines. American officials should be having these experiences themselves.我们经常前往中国，并时常向华盛顿的政策制定者汇报见闻。当我们讲述与中国领导人、专家的近期对话，剖析其体制运作、官方媒体报道背后的内部争论与利益博弈时，他们总是格外专注。美国官员本应亲身前去体验这些东西。After traveling to Shanghai in September, Representative Ro Khanna, Democrat of California, said he hadn’t realized how “advanced” the city was, and concluded, “We need far more trips to China.” Many others have returned from China recently with similar impressions.加州民主党众议员罗·卡纳9月访问上海后表示，此前并未意识到这座城市如此“先进”，并总结道：“我们需要更多访华行程。”其他还有许多人士近期从中国归来时也有类似感受。Firsthand engagement can make clear to Beijing that certain American concerns are shared across party lines. When Senator Charles Schumer, Democrat of New York, traveled there as part of a rare delegation in 2023, his bipartisan group pressed President Xi Jinping on controlling fentanyl precursor chemicals, adding to a broader diplomatic effort that led to a commitment from Beijing to do more.亲身接触能让北京清楚地意识到，美国的某些关切是两党共识。2023年，纽约州民主党参议员查尔斯·舒默率领一个罕见的跨党派代表团访华时，就管控芬太尼前体化学品问题向习近平主席施压，这一行动配合更广泛外交努力，最终促使北京承诺采取更多行动。Former Representative Mike Gallagher once dismissed diplomacy with China as “zombie engagement” — empty talk with no meaningful outcomes. But at the very least, dialogue can yield useful clues about Chinese thinking and build personal relationships that may prove useful in a crisis.前众议员迈克·加拉格尔曾将对华外交斥为“僵尸接触”——空有对话、毫无实质成果。但至少，对话能提供了解中方思路的有用线索，并且建立个人关系，这些在危机时刻可能派上用场。One step Mr. Trump should take is to direct Secretary of State Marco Rubio to restore the China travel programs that were previously authorized under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, which provides a legal framework for federal employees to participate in exchanges funded by foreign governments.特朗普应当采取一项举措，指示国务卿鲁比奥恢复此前依据《相互教育与文化交流法案》获批的赴华交流项目，该法案为联邦雇员参与外国政府资助的交流提供了法律框架。As secretary of state, Mike Pompeo saw those programs as “propaganda tools” for Beijing and shut them down in 2020. We should, of course, always remain cleareyed about Chinese motives. But to suggest that the routine hospitality of a foreign government will turn American policymakers into apologists is an insult.前国务卿庞皮欧将这些项目视为北京的“宣传工具”，于2020年予以叫停。当然，我们始终应清醒看待中国的动机。但若声称外国政府的常规接待会让美国政策制定者变成对方的辩护者，这实属侮辱。The answer is not to end these visits but to make them more transparent and reduce the risks of espionage and undue influence. This can be done by requiring prompt disclosure of trips’ funding, purposes and itineraries; banning the participation of lobbyists; and making predeparture security briefings a standard part of the process.解决之道不是终止这些访问，而是提高透明度，降低间谍活动与不当影响的风险。可通过要求及时披露行程资金来源、目的与行程安排；禁止游说者参与；将行前安全简报作为标准流程等方式实现。Restoring regular travel to China will be neither simple nor risk-free. But the greater strategic danger lies in American policies that are based on stale assumptions, secondhand impressions and an incomplete understanding of what China is building.恢复常态化对华出访既非易事，也非毫无风险。但更大的战略风险在于，美国政策建立在过时假设、二手印象与对中国发展的片面认知之上。Jing Qian是亚洲协会副会长，也是亚洲协会政策研究所中国分析中心的创始人和执行主任。Neil Thomas是该中心中国政治研究员，也是宾夕法尼亚大学美中关系未来项目的国家安全研究员。翻译：纽约时报中文网点击查看本文英文版。