Even as the crisis in West Asia continues to unfold, another deadly confrontation is underway between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On Monday, Pakistan bombed a drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul, killing 400 people and injuring 300. The attack on the hospital represents a grave escalation in the already strained relations between the two neighbours, whose ties have remained complicated since 1947.The Durand Line, the British-drawn border, has historically been a source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.While the current conflict is not solely a result of the border dispute, understanding this division is essential to understanding the complexities of the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict. This is compounded further by factors such as the Taliban regime, the Tehrik-e-Taliban -Pakistan (TTP), various historical standoffs, and Pakistan’s policy of Strategic Depth.What is the present conflict?On February 27, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Ghazal Lil Haq, conducting airstrikes on border posts in Afghanistan. Since the onset of the open conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, more than 400 Afghan soldiers and 55 Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives. By March 2, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported at least 146 civilian casualties, with more than half being women and children.On February 26th, the Afghan Army launched an attack on Pakistani military bases, claiming to have killed more than 50 Pakistani soldiers. This action was in retaliation for aerial strikes by Pakistan on February 22nd, which killed over 20 civilians. The present escalation has effectively shattered the fragile ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey in October 2025.TTP: Pakistan’s contradictionThe TTP was founded in 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud, from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region. After Pakistan joined the U.S. war on terror in 2001, military operations against the Taliban and other militant groups intensified in FATA and Pakistan’s northwestern region.Story continues below this adOne significant event was the Lal Masjid siege in 2007, where militants occupied the mosque and demanded societal reforms based on Sharia law. After a week-long operation, Pakistani security forces regained control of the mosque. This siege acted as a catalyst for the formation of TTP just six months later.The group’s activities surged after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021. By 2024, Pakistan reported over 1,000 terror-related incidents linked to the TTP, more than double the number in 2023.Also in Explained | Pakistan strike kills 400 in Kabul: Why Taliban regime rejects Islamabad’s urging to act against TTPThe Taliban have publicly stated that the TTP is not permitted to operate from Afghan territory, asserting that the TTP is an internal issue of Pakistan. However, there are ideological-ethnic similarities between the two groups, as they both originate from the Deoband school of thought. Additionally, the TTP has pledged allegiance to the leadership of the Taliban.Pakistan claims the TTP has received safe shelter in Afghanistan, prompting it to conduct military operations there. Not long ago, the Taliban leadership found refuge in Pakistan, and when the Taliban returned to Afghanistan in 2021, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, publicly celebrated it as a victory on social media.From strategic asset to strategic threatStory continues below this adThroughout both the Cold War and the post–Cold War periods, Pakistan maintained close contacts with various Afghan groups, including the Taliban. It also came under criticism for its links with the Taliban, particularly after the US launched its war in Afghanistan. Over the past two decades, Pakistan has argued that ethnic Pashtun ties across the border and the porous nature of the Durand Line make it easy for Taliban fighters to cross into Pakistan and find refuge there.However, this same rationale now appears to be used against Pakistan itself when it comes to the TTP. Pakistan utilised the border region to engage with the Taliban, intending to leverage the group for its strategic advantage. This strategy is detailed in the book “Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11” by slain Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad. The Pakistani army aimed to maintain control in Afghanistan, as evidenced by the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814, which was taken to Kandahar for safety and negotiation.Under the policy of “Strategic Depth,” developed in the 1980s, Pakistan believed that a friendly regime in Kabul would provide it with strategic leverage and geopolitical advantage in South and Central Asia. The support for the Taliban and other Mujahideen groups began with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and continued under General Zia-ul-Haq. During Operation Cyclone, the CIA provided approximately $20 billion to train the Mujahideen, who later became the Taliban, to combat the Soviets, with Pakistan acting as the key facilitator and enabler.After Pakistan joined the US in its war against Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban became the primary adversary. However, Pakistan eventually relaxed its stance against the Taliban and sheltered some of its leadership. Today, it stands opposed to the Taliban. Still, it remains nearly impossible for Pakistan to entirely suppress sympathies for the group within its territory. To fully understand this situation, we must delve into the history of the Durand Line.The line of controversyStory continues below this adHaroon Sana, in “Frontiers of Faith,” discusses the North-Western Frontier of India during the 1890s, surveyed by British political and military authorities. This region included Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. The British later adopted a “Forward Policy” to administer these territories, establishing the North West Frontier Province in 1901. Hopkins (2020) describes this as “Frontier Governmentality,” in which the relationship between state authority and the tribes was weak, and British sovereignty was notably limited.British interest in the region intensified with the growing concerns about Russian strategic ambitions in Central Asia, prompting a strengthening of frontier policy. Consequently, in 1893, the Durand Line was negotiated between Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan to demarcate spheres of influence between British India and Afghanistan — primarily to create a buffer between British and Russian strategic interests rather than a permanent international boundary.Also Read | Pakistan’s two-front crisis: Caught between Afghanistan and Iran wars, what are Islamabad’s options?Pakistan was created in 1947, at which point the Durand Line, originally intended to be a buffer zone, became a fixed, hardened international boundary stretching approximately 2,460 kilometres. Many Pashtuns found themselves divided by this border, even though their identity and lineage extended across it. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan called for a referendum for the creation of a State of Pakhtoonistan. The Afghan government under King Zahir Shah rejected the Durand Line, arguing it had been signed under duress. In 1947, Afghanistan became the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. In September 1950, Pakistan alleged that Afghan tribesmen and troops had crossed the Durand Line into northern Balochistan, leading to a diplomatic rupture between the two embassies. In 1957, the flag of Pashtunistan was raised at the Pakistan embassy in Kabul. Relations deteriorated further when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated by an Afghan national.In 1960, the Bajaur campaign was initiated by Afghan Prime Minister Daud Khan, escalating into armed conflict. In response, the Pakistan Air Force crossed the border and bombed Afghan military posts. Daud Khan, a supporter of a unified Pashtun state, was nonetheless compelled by pressure from Afghan elites to make peace with Pakistan and resigned in 1963. The idea of Pashtunistan, however, was not entirely abandoned by some within Afghan leadership. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin Daud Khan amid drought, famine, and an ineffective political system. Khan revived the Pashtun movement, abolished the 1964 constitution, and established the Republic of Afghanistan.Story continues below this adDuring the 1970s, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was Prime Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad adopted a “forward policy” towards Afghanistan, aiming to counter Pashtun and other ethno-nationalist movements by supporting Islamist factions within Afghanistan. Leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani reportedly received funding and training from Pakistan to weaken competing political forces. Bhutto viewed these groups as valuable allies in limiting both Indian and communist influence in the region.After General Zia-ul-Haq took power, this policy expanded through the promotion of Deobandi madrassas, which played a significant role in educating and mobilising individuals who later became associated with the Taliban. As noted by Christine Fair, Pakistan’s support for the Mujahideen was a crucial phase in its broader strategy of asymmetric warfare against India. In the following decades, networks that formed during the Afghan jihad were also used as proxies to sustain insurgency in Kashmir. However, today this strategy seems to be failing, as relations between Pakistan and the Taliban have become increasingly strained.The ongoing Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict represents another revealing dimension of Pakistan’s foreign relations. Much like its complicated relationship with the United States, Pakistan has also struggled to maintain stable ties with its neighbour, Afghanistan. The most intriguing aspect of this relationship today is that Pakistan faces defiance and resistance from the very Taliban that it once assumed to be under its strategic influence and control.Dhananjay Tripathi is Senior Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, South Asian University. Tabshir Shams is pursuing MA in International Relations, South Asian University.