Last week in New York, the Russian-Chinese draft resolution to delay the re-imposition of United Nations sanctions on Iran by six months failed in the Security Council. Four members voted in favour, nine against, and two abstained.That failure has resulted in two outcomes. First, it confirmed the automatic “snapback” of all prior UN sanctions on Iran as of midnight today. Second, it underscored the collapse of the 30-day diplomatic window meant to broker a compromise. In short, diplomacy failed, sanctions returned. The vote highlighted the sharp divide between Western powers and the China-Russia-Iran axis.AdvertisementAfter Israel’s attack on Iranian facilities and subsequent US bombings of enrichment sites in June, Tehran entered talks with the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). The E3 proposed a temporary six-month extension if Iran agreed to three conditions: Restore full IAEA safeguards inspections (halted after the bombings), account for 408.6 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, and resume diplomatic negotiations with the US and other parties.Iran’s foreign minister claimed that the uranium was trapped under bombed installations and that Iran was “assessing whether these materials are accessible or not”, while Western officials suspected it had been removed beforehand. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, meanwhile, categorically rejected any resumption of talks with Washington.Also Read | Express View on US strikes on Iran: A defining, dangerous momentOn August 28, the E3 formally invoked the “snapback” mechanism under UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015), triggering a 30-day countdown. Moscow, rejecting the validity of the move, tabled its own resolution with Chinese support to extend sanctions relief by six months. That resolution failed yesterday, ensuring the automatic return of the sanctions. The timing also mattered. By acting in August, the E3 sidestepped October, when Russia will hold the Council presidency — an unmistakable sign of how geopolitics now shapes procedure.AdvertisementIran tried limited steps this month: Reaching a September 9 agreement with the IAEA on inspections, and withdrawing a resolution it had introduced at the IAEA General Conference condemning the attacks on its facilities. Yet these gestures did little to alter the trajectory. Washington, convinced that its strikes on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan had decidedly set back Iran’s program, saw no reason for accommodation — contrary to the E3’s preference for a diplomatic path.President Masoud Pezeshkian denounced the snapback as “unfair, unjust, and illegal,” arguing that Iran’s actions were justified under the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) because of other parties’ non-compliance, particularly the US withdrawal in 2018. Tehran is expected to suspend the cooperation agreement it reached with the IAEA in Cairo, though it is unlikely to withdraw from the NPT, as this would be discouraged by both Moscow and Beijing.The return of sanctions delivers a political and psychological blow that would aggravate Iran’s economic crisis and social discontent already worsened by years of US “maximum pressure” measures and the recent conflict with Israel. The sanctions restore embargoes on nuclear and missile technology, conventional arms transfers, asset freezes, and banking restrictions. But they do not explicitly impose an oil embargo.Still, US secondary sanctions remain decisive. Any refinery, financial institution, or shipping company dealing with Iranian oil faces penalties. The UN’s call for financial vigilance compounds the risk, making it risky and costlier for banks and shippers to facilitate sales. The practical effect will be Washington tightening its grip on global enforcement.China will likely continue as Iran’s primary oil buyer, but under tougher terms. Increased operational risks enhance Beijing’s bargaining power, forcing Tehran into more disadvantageous deals. Beyond economics, diplomacy has been complicated further. The snapback strengthens the rationale for future Israeli or US military action. History signals caution: Washington’s “maximum pressure” on North Korea helped drive Pyongyang down the nuclear path. Iran may now feel a similar compulsion.For India, the UN sanctions on Iran coincide with the development of Washington’s “maximum pressure” on Iran by revoking the waiver on Chabahar Port. India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) has been operating the Shahid Behesht Terminal in the port, which is critical for our westward connectivity strategy.India stopped importing Iranian oil years ago, but Chabahar remains vital for accessing Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. The US waiver allowed progress despite wider sanctions. Its revocation means we have to reconcile our Eurasian strategy with the new developments.most readThe collapse of diplomacy and the re-imposition of sanctions mark a sobering turn. For Iran, it is another squeeze. For the West, a tactical victory with uncertain consequences. For Russia and China, a demonstration of limited leverage. And for us, a reminder that in the game of sanctions and counter-sanctions involving others, strategic projects like Chabahar are never insulated.The snapback may have been designed for Iran. But its aftershocks will ripple far beyond.The writer is former Governor of India to IAEA, Vienna