When it comes to diplomatic visits, timing is rarely trivial. In this sense, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel on February 25 is significant not merely because of what will be signed or announced, but because of when it is happening.First, it is only the second time in India’s history that an Indian Prime Minister is officially travelling to Israel after Modi’s first visit in July 2017. By contrast, Modi has already visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE) seven times since 2015. This disparity is partly explained by India’s historical support for Palestinian nationalism and consistent advocacy for the two-state solution. Just a few days before Modi’s planned visit to Tel Aviv, India again condemned, with more than 100 other states, Israel’s de facto expansion into the West Bank (although New Delhi initially appeared to hesitate over adding its name to the statement).AdvertisementSecond, Israel today faces a degree of diplomatic isolation unprecedented in recent years — particularly across the Global South. Since the October 7 attacks and the devastating war in Gaza that followed, many developing countries have either sharply criticised Israel’s military campaign or kept high-level engagement at arm’s length. Western leaders visited in the early days of the war; far fewer from Asia, Africa, or Latin America followed. In that context, Modi’s presence in Tel Aviv is not routine diplomacy. It is perceived as a geopolitical signal.Third, this visit comes amid heightened regional uncertainty. The Middle East is once again on edge, with a visible US military build-up aimed at Iran. Tensions between Israel and Iran have become increasingly direct, moving beyond covert warfare. Maritime security in the Red Sea remains fragile and directly affects Indian commercial interests. Energy markets remain sensitive. For India — heavily dependent on Gulf energy flows and deeply invested in regional stability — this ongoing volatility is a key concern.Against this backdrop, Modi’s visit serves multiple purposes. First, it reassures Israel of India’s reliability as a long-term strategic partner at a moment when Israel’s diplomatic space is constrained. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already welcomed the visit from an important partner that has 1.4 billion people and is “enormously powerful, enormously popular”. India has, over the past decade, and especially since Modi’s election in 2014, transformed its relationship with Israel from quiet defence cooperation into a more visible strategic partnership. Defence ties remain the backbone of that relationship. Israel has been one of India’s most important suppliers of advanced military technology — from air defence systems and drones to precision-guided munitions and surveillance platforms, at a total worth of $2.9 billion over the last decade. India also remains Israel’s first market for defence exports, accounting for 34 per cent of total sales between 2020 and 2024.AdvertisementThe timing is also particularly notable given India’s own recent security experiences. The 88-hour military confrontation with Pakistan in May 2025 underscored the centrality of high-technology warfare, air defence integration, and rapid response capabilities, all domains where Israel’s defence equipment and logistical support were decisive. In the aftermath of the May crisis, India has moved to further strengthen deterrence and modernise procurement. Reports suggest that recently finalised new defence purchases or co-development agreements will be announced during the visit. If so, this would signal that India views Israeli defence technology as fully integral to its evolving security doctrine.Additionally, the visit underscores India’s interest in long-term connectivity and economic integration projects that depend on regional stability — most notably the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC, envisioned as a multimodal trade and infrastructure corridor linking India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel, was announced with great fanfare during the G20 hosted by India, but quickly overshadowed by war. For New Delhi, reviving or sustaining momentum behind IMEC requires engagement with all its nodes — including Israel, and some of Israel’s close partners such as Greece and Cyprus.Connectivity is not merely about trade; it is about geopolitical architecture. While it is not clear whether India embraces Netanyahu’s “hexagon of alliances” framing, it does see IMEC as a mechanism to embed itself structurally in Middle Eastern and European supply chains, notably following the recently signed FTAs with the UAE and the EU. In this sense, the visit is as much about long-term economic positioning as about defence deals.Third, the visit unfolds as India assumes the BRICS chairship and plans to hold the 18th BRICS summit. That timing adds another layer of meaning. Many BRICS members have adopted sharply critical stances toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza, often putting India at odds with its partners. By engaging Israel directly while also preparing to convene major emerging powers, India will need to explain and justify its national strategic positioning in these multilateral fora where it has been competing with China for influence.This balancing act reflects a broader evolution in Indian foreign policy. Some observers may interpret the visit as evidence that India is drifting away from its long-standing multi-alignment strategy toward a more explicit alignment with Israel. That reading is too simplistic.India’s Middle East policy has never been zero-sum. Even as defence cooperation with Israel has deepened, India has simultaneously expanded ties with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and maintained economic ties with Iran until recently. It continues to rely on Gulf states for energy security, diaspora employment, and investment flows. It maintains political links with the Palestinian leadership and has hosted the Arab League summit in New Delhi as recently as January 2026. In addition, India still does not formally designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation — a deliberate distinction that preserves diplomatic flexibility.In other words, Modi’s visit should not be interpreted as a wholesale embrace of Netanyahu’s security priorities. India’s engagement with Israel is interest-based, not ideological. It is driven by defence technology needs, economic integration ambitions, and geopolitical positioning — not by a deliberate intention to replicate Israel’s regional posture or internal politics.you may likeIndeed, India’s own strategic calculus diverges from Israel’s in important ways. New Delhi has consistently emphasised de-escalation in the region, mindful of the consequences of a wider war involving Iran. It cannot afford energy disruption or regional fragmentation, given its economic and energy needs and the welfare of its 9 million-strong diaspora in the region. Its approach to Iran remains cautious but pragmatic, particularly given connectivity interests such as the Chabahar port. And as a country signalling it aims to be a voice within the Global South, India must maintain credibility across diverse constituencies, including those deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.Ultimately, the visit reflects a great degree of continuity in India’s approach to the Middle East. Multi-alignment in the region has never been so much about equidistance but about maximising options. Modi’s trip to Israel does not herald a dramatic realignment, at least in substance. However, timing is not incidental. It can be understood as an expression of greater confidence in navigating a turbulent region. It remains to be seen how the multiple global, regional and domestic audiences will perceive the optics of a Modi-Netanyahu embrace at this crucial juncture.The writer is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University in the Netherlands