In the pitch darkness of Bastar’s Korcholi forest, a sentry stood guard outside a Maoist hideout. A platoon party committee member, he had a Light Machine Gun slung across his shoulder. It’s a deadly weapon, capable of spraying bullets in the blink of an eye. Something stirred in the foliage 20 meters away. The sentry stiffened, cocked his gun and called out in Gondi, “Who is it?”“It’s me,” came the reply. The voice was of a former Naxal-turned-District Reserve Guard (DRG) – he had caught the glint of the sentry’s LMG in the moonlight. The familiarity worked; the sentry let his guard down. Seconds later, he was taken down.Recalling the operations of that day, April 2, 2024, when 13 Maoists were gunned down in Korcholi, Bijapur district, in a joint operation by security forces, Bijapur Deputy Superintendent of Police (anti-Naxal operations) Sudeep Sarkar says, “The Maoists suffered their highest casualties in Dandakaranya since 2017 in that operation. The DRG played a pivotal role and caused maximum damage.”After four decades of an ideology-driven fight against the State, the Maoist movement in India is at its weakest, battered by a string of encounters and high-profile surrenders, including of Politburo members Mallojula Venugopal Rao alias Sonu and, more recently, Thippiri Tirupathi alias Devuji. For the State, this ties in well with Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s March 31, 2026 deadline for “eliminating” Naxalism.The road to that impending rout goes through Chhattisgarh, particularly Bastar, where, as a senior police officer told The Indian Express, some militia and cadres, led by lower-rung military commanders, are still active.Between 2004, when the CPI Maoist was formed, and 2010-2011, while the Maoists suffered setbacks elsewhere, Bastar remained their battleground, the site of many pitched clashes between security forces and the rebels.But now, the tide has changed. In the 23 years since the state was formed, an average of about 48 Maoists were killed each year in Chhattisgarh. In the last two years, that annual figure has surged to around 250, a rise of over 400%. At the same time, rebel violence against civilians and security forces has declined. Over those 23 years, an average of 74 civilians and 56 jawans were killed annually. In the past two years, those numbers have fallen sharply to 56 civilians and 21 jawans.Story continues below this adA key part of this pushback is being led by crack units from within the state police, from the DRG to the newer Bastar Fighters – young men and women drawn from the local tribal population.The rise of a crack unitBastar can be unforgiving, more so if you are an outsider. Thickly forested by sal, teak and bamboo, visibility often drops to a few metres. Besides, the harsh summer months, the steep gradients, rocky outcrops, nallahs and rivers that swell unexpectedly, the limited infrastructure and the tribal dialects make it almost impossible to navigate for those unfamiliar with the terrain. But those who have grown up in these parts know the land intimately. The bend in the river, the point where the walking trail disappears, the next water source and the escape routes.It’s this familiarity with the land and the people that gave the Maoist cadres – almost all of them local recruits – an edge over the ‘outsiders’ in Bastar, creating a security vacuum that was larger than in some of the other states.Officials who have served in Bastar say that for long, the operational planning of the forces stood exposed – they often lacked the depth required to penetrate deep into the forests.Story continues below this ad“It was a time marked by frequent ambushes, limited road connectivity, and a significant security vacuum in core areas,” says Inspector General of Police for Bastar Range, Sundarraj P, the longest serving IPS officer in Bastar.What the security forces needed on their side was someone who knew the terrain as much as their rivals. In 2014-2015, the Chhattisgarh government set up the DRG, drawing personnel from the local tribal population and, in some cases, surrendered Maoist cadres.Until the DRG entered the scene, anti-Naxal operations in Chhattisgarh were carried out by a loose mix of the state police, locally recruited auxiliaries and the central paramilitary force, mainly the CRPF and its commando unit, CoBRA.The DRG was born out of the success story of forces such as the Greyhounds in the united Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand’s Jharkhand Jaguars and Maharashtra’s C60. These lean crack commando units raised out of state police and local population had proved effective in counter-Maoist operations. The security establishment was convinced that only the state police, not the central forces, would prove to be effective against the Maoists.Story continues below this adMany in the security establishment argue that the DRG’s seeds were sown by Congress leader Mahender Karma, who helped launch the Salwa Judum movement in 2005, when tribals were armed with State backing to fight the Maoists. However, its semi-formal nature turned it into a vigilante group with disastrous results and, in 2011, the Supreme Court struck it down.The DRG was thus created from among the same tribal population, but this time, with full legal sanction and under a formal recruitment structure. The government tweaked some of the recruitment norms related to age, physical requirements and educational qualifications, especially for candidates from remote tribal regions.Retired DGP R K Vij says the need for a specialised force to deal with Naxals arose because the district Superintendents of Police never had enough men to spare for anti-Naxal operations.“It was difficult to conduct operations on actionable intelligence. We were dependent on Central forces and whichever personnel we could take out of local police stations,” says Vij.Story continues below this adIG Sundarraj says that soon after the introduction of the DRG, anti-Naxal operations became “proactive, intelligence-driven, and mission-oriented, rather than reactive. With vastly improved local intelligence inputs, language familiarity, and deep terrain knowledge, security forces were able to move confidently through dense forest and hilly areas”.Additional Director General (Naxal operations), Vivekanand Sinha says that in 2017, when he was IG for Bastar range, in a meeting in Andhra Pradesh, he tried convincing the Greyhounds, the state’s specialised Anti-Naxal force, to include personnel from Bastar’s DRG in their operation. “They were finally convinced by 2022 and we conducted a joint operation in 2023… The DRG is a force that can sustain even a seven-day operation on their own. They can cover a 45-km stretch in one go without halting. They know the terrain and tracks like the back of their hand. Now they have proved it. Along with local forces like the District Strike Force, the Bastar Fighters and the Special Task Force, they changed the tide,” he says.A police source says that while the DRGs are credited with over 90% of the killings of Maoists and 70% of the arrests in Chhattisgarh, they are complimented by Central forces such as the CRPF, BSF and ITBP, who undertake joint operations, apart from playing a crucial role in the making of police camps, conducting Road Opening Parties and reaching out to villagers with medicines and other government benefits.On the role of the DRGs once the government declares the battle against Maoists over, IG Sundarraj says, “With the significant weakening of the Naxal movement, the role of the DRG gradually transitions from high-intensity combat operations to area domination, stabilisation, and consolidation of security gains.”Story continues below this ad A DRG jawan on patrol in Bijapur district, part of intensified operations against Maoist cadres. (Photo credit: Chitral Khambhati)‘Stop them from retreating’Mahipal Achla, 29, was 14 when he joined the Maoists. For a decade, he was the bodyguard of retired general secretary and ‘most-wanted’ Maoist, Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy. In 2022, Achla surrendered; he is now a DRG commander. “I missed my family,” he says of his decision to walk out of the forests. “I could meet his mother only twice in 14 years.”Since then, he has been a vital member of the DRG, providing key intelligence and inputs, including that the best way to strike is by going on the offensive.“Back when I was Ganapathy’s bodyguard (2011 to 2021), we were taught that we need to retreat and hide when the enemy is powerful. They (the security forces) come well prepared when they are heading for an operation and so, that’s not the best time to engage with them. We were told to attack only when the enemy is weak, when the forces are retreating,” he says.Be it the 2010 Tadmetla hills ambush, where 76 jawans were killed, or the January 2025 attack in which eight jawans and a civilian driver in Kutru were killed after their vehicle was blown up, Maoists have always struck when the jawans, tired after an operation, were retreating.Story continues below this ad“I knew that when we (DRG) surround the Maoists, their first instinct is to retreat. So, we now cordon off the entire area, stop them from retreating and track them down,” he says.It was a strategy the DRG employed with success in May this year, when Ganapathy’s successor and Maoist general secretary Nambala Keshav Rao, 70, better known as Basava Raju, was killed along with 26 Maoists in a fierce gun battle.Also Read | ‘Brick by brick’: Behind the ‘conscious decision’ to demolish Maoist memorials in BastarNarayanpur Superintendent of Police Robinson Guria says the DRG played a crucial role in not only identifying Maoists but also facilitating 90% of the surrenders in Narayanpur.A DRG source who was part of the operation says, “Basava’s location was narrowed down thanks to some surrenders months before the final encounter. We got him on the third day while we were retreating. On the first day, his team tried to escape towards Bijapur and an exchange of fire took place. They found Basava’s folding stool. On the second and third day, we could not find him though he was near us. We were told to carry out combing on a hill before heading back. As soon as undercover police personnel led us towards the hill, Basava’s team panicked and opened fire, killing him. We then cordoned off the hill and 45 minutes later, it was all over. Basava was killed.”Story continues below this adDamini Uikey, 27, a tribal from Bakulwai village in Narayanpur, says she joined the Bastar Fighters in 2022. A graduate, she says she is grateful she has a job when most others in her village struggle for basics. “They do not have clothes on their bodies… no schools, no income, no food at home. I cannot imagine how they walk all that way, up the hills, crossing streams, to collect rice at the ration shops,” she says about those stuck between the Naxals and the security forces. Preparations underway in Uskaled village as villagers arrange tributes for DRG jawan Mohan Baddi before his funeral rites. (Photo credit: Chitral Khambhati)‘It was either him or me’At the age of six, Nayankumar Kodiyam, 25, witnessed his father Chnaram, sarpanch of Mormed village in Bijapur, being killed by Maoists. “He ran for his life but they shot him in the leg. Then they dragged him in front of the villagers and tied him up. We begged them not to kill him. But they shot him in the chest, chanted Lal Salam and left.”In 2023, Kodiyam was selected as a Bastar Fighter, a newer version of the DRG formed in 2022 and which consists of youth from remote villages. Kodiyam recollects how his team walked over 80 kilometers in three days for a massive encounter at the Indravati National Park in February 2025, when 31 Maoists and two jawans were killed. “On the third day, we had no food or water left and were very tired. The Maoists were constantly changing their locations. We got them at the fourth try,” he says.Growing up in these parts is tough, so when Kodiyam speaks of hardships – his father’s death and much later, a colleague’s, and an encounter that nearly cost his finger – it’s without drama. It’s the kind of steel the DRG demands of its men. A memorial is built in Uskaled village to honour DRG jawan Mohan Baddi after he was killed in an anti-Maoist operation. (Photo credit: Chitral Khambhati)Talking of the time he was injured, he says a splinter from a grenade blast hit him during Operation Black Forest, the longest-ever battle with Maoists on the Kare Gutta hills on the Bijapur-Telangana border in April this year, when 31 Maoists were killed.Kodiyam’s index finger was almost ripped off and a rod had to be inserted to keep it in place. In two months, Kodiyam was back in action. Since then, he has taken part in over 100 operations, including in Korcholi, Bijapur, on December 3, when he lost his colleague. Twelve Maoists and three DRG jawans were killed in the operation.“We were chasing two of the Maoists when we reached a field where there was no place for us to hide. We lay on the ground below a tree and kept firing but my teammate Mohan Baddi got hit and I dragged him to safety while others provided cover fire. He kept saying, kuch kar (do something), but we could not save him,” says Kodiyam.Senior security personnel say the presence of DRG personnel in their ranks cut down operational time. “Back in 2022, we received intel on a divisional committee member, Mohan Kadti (now surrendered), around 12 noon. In 45 minutes, we planned the operation and set off for the location which was 60 km away. By 2.15 pm, we had cordoned off the area and neutralised Kadti’s bodyguard, though he got away,” says Vinod Lakda, a DRG official.The daredevilry, however, comes at a cost. As the body bags come home, it often holds a “son of the soil”, someone who died fighting those who grew up on the same red earth. Family members mourn during the funeral of DRG jawan Mohan Baddi in Uskaled village, Bijapur district. (Photo credit: Chitral Khambhati)A DRG jawan who spoke on condition of anonymity says, “My cousin was among the 31 Maoists who were killed in the Indravati National Park in February (2025). I was part of the operation. He had sent a message saying he would kill me. So it was either me or him.”Since the establishment of the DRG, 82 of its personnel have laid down their lives. At least in a couple of instances, in 2023 and 2025, vehicles with security personnel, among them DRGs, were blown apart in massive IED blasts leading to over a dozen deaths. According to Bastar police’s data, 18 DRG jawans have lost their limbs and 32 of their relatives have been murdered by Maoists for being, “mukhbir (informers)”.At Uskaled village in Bijapur district, the piercing cries of the mourners tear through the drum beats and the curling smoke from incense sticks. Preparations are on for the funeral of Mohan Baddi, Kodiyam’s colleague who died in the December 3 encounter at Korcholi. He leaves behind his family – parents, siblings and their families – and an unfulfilled dream of building a house for them.Police sources said personnel, including those of the DRG, who are killed fighting Maoists receive approximately Rs 1.10 crore as monetary support and benefits.As the drum beats get louder outside, Baddi’s sister Ravanamma says, “We called him Monu… His childhood was spent in hardships. Our family was poor and he struggled for food and education. We thought he had a job with the government and our lives would improve, but now he is gone. All the other boys are here, but Monu is missing.”