By: David Scott MathiesonHave the partial elections in Myanmar, which concluded in late January, sparked a change in approach to the war-torn country by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations? Since April 2021, following the coup d’etat that sparked continuing fierce resistance across the country, ASEAN has promoted a Five Point Consensus, nicknamed the 5PC, to engage the military regime, end hostilities, support dialogue, appoint an envoy to visit Myanmar and support humanitarian assistance. That consensus has been the core instrument of the regional grouping since then and has garnered support from ASEAN’s many dialogue partners in the West. It has also been a dismal failure.In the five years of the consensus, regional diplomacy has made little impact on ending violence or fostering dialogue between the junta, known as the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), and multiple armed actors or the exiled National Unity Government (NUG). Barring the head of the regime, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from ASEAN annual summits has been the only punitive action taken. Robust efforts by Indonesia and Malaysia, in 2024 and 2025, respectively, were notable for expanding consultations with multiple stakeholders from Myanmar and understanding the complex conflict and political dynamics of the conflict. But they have done little to transform the 5PC from principle to real action. Could that be changing?Hints at change of approachIn a recent interview with Thai PBS, Philippine Foreign Minister Ma. Theresa Lazaro said “(t)o a certain extent, I think there should be some kind of a review of the Five-Point Consensus,” while also affirming that the 5PC remains a “foundational document” and mulling the appointment of a full-time envoy. At present, the rotating chair of ASEAN designates their foreign minister as the groupings envoy as stipulated in the consensus. How useful would a review be to shaking off the inertia of the consensus? At the late-January ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat in Cebu, the concluding statement “reiterated our united position that the 5PC remains our primary reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar and…emphasized ASEAN’s commitment and role to assist Myanmar in charting a future and a peaceful and lasting solution to the crisis which is both Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led, while reaffirming that Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN.” This has been standard language for ASEAN statements since 2021.The statement also affirmed the bloc’s position that there be “free, fair, peaceful, transparent, inclusive, and credible general elections in Myanmar…(and) noted the conclusion of the three phases of the general elections.” By no measure were the elections credible. The SSPC’s claim that there was a 52 percent voter turnout stretches credulity to the breaking point. Yet an announcement that the national, state and regional parliaments will convene on March 16, and a new “government” formed in early April may generate some interest in a change of approach by ASEAN. Progress questionableIt is hard to consider exactly how ASEAN could achieve any more progress on dialogue or conflict de-escalation from outside diplomatic efforts, even with a supposedly “civilian administration.” Yet key member states have already expressed efforts to deepen engagement with a new administration in the administrative capital Naypyidaw. Following a meeting with Myanmar Foreign Minister Than Swe in Phuket last week, Thai foreign minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow told the media, “Thailand wants to be a bridge connecting Myanmar back to ASEAN…Myanmar must help Thailand as well by responding to ASEAN’s concerns, such as starting a dialogue process, which is a good thing; reducing violence; avoiding attacks on civilians.” The fraudulent but largely peaceful elections may be one of the foundations of that future bridge.In many respects, the 5PC consensus is an official front for what is business as usual for Myanmar as a member of ASEAN. State media routinely reports officials attending multiple regional forums, from tourism, health, the recent ‘Digital Ministers Meeting’, and a range of military forums. This is working level endorsement. The Executive Director of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, Lee Yam Ming, visited Naypyidaw on February 25, so in some respects, that part of the 5PC is functional.What would the appointment of a full-time envoy achieve as opposed to rotating envoys? Political capital from ASEAN’s Secretariat is determined by member states interests, and Myanmar fueled divisions within ASEAN, from apathy amongst some states, the exasperation of others that Min Aung Hlaing has rebuffed ASEAN’s efforts, especially Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Also missing in action are all the other envoys for Myanmar, including Julie Bishop, the UN Secretary General’s envoy appointed in 2024, and the European Union’s envoy (who is the EU ambassador to Cambodia). Bishop visited Myanmar following the March 2025 earthquake, but her diplomacy has yielded no results. Rebels fracturedAny changing approach by ASEAN would have to contend with a fractured Myanmar opposition, including the scandal-plagued and increasingly unpopular NUG, various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and emerging “political units” from the center of the country, and civil society organizations. Any peace bridging would also have to consider partial inclusion, as many northern EAOs in China’s sphere of interest would likely decline inclusion in any dialogue process not under the direct remit of Beijing. Does ASEAN have the capacity to support, even in minimal fashion, a peace process for one of the most complicated armed conflicts in the world?Overshadowing the 5PC and ASEAN diplomacy is the specter of fragmentation as the civil war drags on. While the Myanmar military has clawed back some territory it lost in late 2023, large swathes of the country in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Northern Shan State and Kayin State are under the administration of various EAOs, as the partial elections of the past two months made starkly clear. The 5PC needs a significant reworking for these reasons alone: Myanmar is not the same country it was five years ago. Or will ASEAN still cling to a toothless consensus and gradual engagement with a new permutation of authoritarian regime with a civilian front?David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar and a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel