Khamenei has safeguarded the regime so that the hardline Qom clergy and the security establishment will remain dominant after his death. By Shay Khatiri, Middle East ForumOn February 19, 2026, President Donald Trump issued a two-week ultimatum to Iran, a timeline that allows the USS Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group to arrive in the region.The deployment of the second aircraft carrier and Air Force assets makes this the largest deployment of force to the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War. The administration is considering a Venezuela-style regime decapitation as an alternative.In Venezuela, the United States had established contacts with Vice President Delcy Rodriguez prior to President Nicolás Maduro’s capture. But Venezuela and Iran are not analogous.Unlike in Venezuela, where the vice president constitutionally takes power upon the president’s incapacitation or death, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has no single clear successor.According to the Islamic Republic’s constitution, if the supreme leader dies, is impeached, or becomes incapacitated, a temporary council takes over his duties until the Assembly of Experts finds a replacement.This council includes the president, the chief justice, and one of the six clerics of the Guardian Council, whom the Expediency Council selects.The Expediency Council’s thirty-three members, by law, include the president, the chief justice, and the six clerics of the Guardian Council. This incestuousness is purposeful.Two contexts matter. First, the two fixed members will be reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i. The third member will be the tiebreaker, subjecting his selection to much backroom politicking.Pezeshkian has no significant base within the system. Former president Mohammad Khatami described the presidency as “the regime’s footman.” Since his time, its role has diminished further.Personally, Pezeshkian was a marginalized member of the parliament before ascending to the presidency, deemed irrelevant enough to survive the 2010s’ crackdown on the reform movement.Eje’i is the opposite. He attended the Qom seminary and used to be the chief judge of the special court for the clergy. At Khamenei’s behest, he homogenized the clergy in favor of the regime.He has been a feature of the secret police, too, including during the 1990s-era serial killings of prominent reformists.Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Eje’i became the minister of intelligence, which oversees the secret police, but Ahmadinejad eventually ousted him as part of his own power struggle with Khamenei.Chief Justice Sadeq Larijani appointed him as attorney general, before Eje’i later succeeded Larijani.Sadeq Larijani has for seven years served as the head of the Expediency Council, which selects the third member of the provisional leadership council.He is a graduate of the Qom seminary and a member of the hardline Qom Seminary Educators party. Like Eje’i, he has deep connections within the pro-regime and hardline clergy, but not much in the security establishment.Ali Larijani, Sadeq’s brother, heads the Supreme National Security Council, and the law entitles him to a seat at the Expediency Council.He retired from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a general in 1992 but has deep ties in the armed forces. He has been a loyal foot soldier for Khamenei. He is also a hardliner.The Assembly of Experts is the last power broker. Hardline clerics, especially the more political Qom seminary bloc, dominate it.If U.S. forces kill Khamenei, the Larijani brothers will use their influence to appoint a third member, necessarily a cleric, to sideline Pezeshkian ideologically.Considering that there would be an ongoing war, the armed forces will lean on the Expediency Council and the Larijanis to select a member of the Guardian Council who would represent their interest.Three likeliest candidates include Ahmad Khatami, Mehdi Shabzendedar Jahromi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani.The practical challenge of this process is convening during wartime. The Islamic Republic faced this challenge during the June 2025 war, during which Pezeshkian barely escaped death.For the same reason, the Assembly of Experts, mostly composed of elderly clerics, will not meet to announce a new supreme leader until the war is over.Khamenei has safeguarded the regime so that the hardline Qom clergy and the security establishment will remain dominant after his death.Regime alteration in Iran requires elevating a figure such as reformist Ayatollah Javad Alavi Boroujerdi to the supreme leadership, but the U.S. government has little leverage over Iran’s power brokers.Washington’s only leverage over the Islamic Republic is the lives of the power brokers in the security and clerical establishments.Assassinating too many senior officeholders risks a military dictatorship. Assassinating too many military commanders risks disintegration.Assassinating Khamenei and leaving the rest of the regime intact risks preserving it in its current form, and leaving the leadership intact will embolden Khamenei, who equates survival with victory.The post Who will rule Iran if the United States kills Khamenei? appeared first on World Israel News.