Trump’s goals in Iran are not yet clear: Is he seeking regime change? Or simply to pressure Iran to make a deal.By Michael Rubin, Middle East ForumBeyond Bombing: The Critical Flaw in the U.S. Plan for 2026 Regime Change in IranWith two aircraft carrier strike groups converging on Iran and bombers readied at Diego Garcia, the Islamic Republic of Iran now faces the largest U.S. military deployment since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.While progressive Democrats and libertarian Republicans question Trump’s authority to act, Congress long ago forfeited its credibility on the issue with its failure to stand up to Trump’s predecessors.Representatives can criticize, and pundits fill copy, but when Trump doubts the authority of the Supreme Court, the idea that a pointed speech or critical op-ed about the need for an Authorization for the Use of Military Force would change his mind is insane.While Trump put U.S. legitimacy on the line when, on January 2, 2026, he declared, “If Iran violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go.”The Iranian regime subsequently murdered upwards of 35,000 protestors and bystanders, putting Trump and U.S. credibility on the line. Trump subsequently suggested that he won an agreement to stop imminent executions, but Iranians now say that executions continue.Should Trump walk away from his call to action and redlines, he merely follows the precedent set by George H.W. Bush, who called on the Iraqi people to oust Saddam only to walk away when the Ba’athist regime started massacring those who rose up, and also Barack Obama, who walked back his redline on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons.Trump, however, has sought to differentiate himself from Bush and Obama, not become their second coming.Seldom has there been a looming military campaign whose goals are so unclear. The elder Bush sent forces to the Middle East to liberate Kuwait.His son returned forces to oust Saddam and establish a democracy in the heart of the Middle East. Obama entered the Libyan theater due to a “responsibility to protect.”In Syria, too, he was clear about U.S. goals. “I determined that it is in the national security interests of the United States to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons through a targeted military strike. The purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad from using chemical weapons, to degrade his regime’s ability to use them, and to make clear to the world that we will not tolerate their use,” Obama explained in a nationwide address.What Are Trump’s Goals in an Iran Attack?Trump’s goals in Iran are not yet clear: Is he seeking regime change? Or simply to pressure Iran to make a deal. If the latter, are his demands limited to the nuclear program, or will they include Iran’s ballistic missile programs and its proxy support network?If regime change is the goal, will Trump invest in what comes next? Is the goal only decapitation at the top?Does Trump envision a Venezuela-like model? And could such a model even apply to Iran, where there is no clear successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei?If Trump seeks broader regime change, how many layers of regime leadership would he target, and how would he fill the vacuum?If Trump killed Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, but Iranians then rallied around other pro-Islamic Republic figures like National Security Council chief Ali Larijani or former President Hassan Rouhani, would Trump conduct a round two of assassinations until then Iranians “chose right”?In 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency sought to insert into Iraq both Nizar al-Khazraji, a former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, and Majid al-Khoei, son of grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei. Both failed.Khazraji, whom the CIA reportedly helped spring from prison in Denmark, never attracted the following Langley hoped, while thugs loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr hacked al-Khoei to death inside the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf.Ayad Allawi, the CIA’s plan B, likewise never attracted the following in Baghdad that he enjoyed in Washington, London, and Amman.In the case of Iran, there is renewed U.S. government interest in former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, but his own office remains in disarray, and his aides and supporters seem more intent on attacking each other and other opposition leaders than on the regime itself.Even if Pahlavi had the boldness to return to Iran, it is unclear if he could walk the tightrope between security and accessibility.If Pahlavi ends up like Al-Khoei, would there be any Plan B for the monarchists or even any figure that could unite disparate factions as Pahlavi does?Nor is Trump clear on what targeting could enforce humanitarian redlines, what sort of targeting would that entail? The Pentagon has the precision to take out prison guard towers and walls, but can it stop a massacre of prisoners?In war games, U.S. authorities dealt with the possibility that Iran might bomb its own schools or buses to blame the United States and cause international outrage.If “Pallywood” falsehoods incited lasting hatred against Israel, why should the Iranian regime not use the same cynical tactics against the United States?Likewise, if Trump rules out ground intervention, what is to stop the regime from killing hundreds of thousands of protestors instead of just tens of thousands?If Khamenei were to do so, what could the United States do to stop it?The Iranian people’s well-being was never Khamenei’s top concern; he regularly castigates Iranians who do not embrace his religious philosophy as “enemies of God” and “corruption on Earth,” whose deaths are net positives.It is also unclear if Trump will target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and, if so, what that means. The Guards are not a monolith: There is national leadership, but also provincial units.The Tehran-based leaders are much harder line, but the local units do the dirty work. After U.S. hostilities began in Libya and Iraq, criticism of U.S. planning emerged due to a failure to secure arms caches.Iran is four times the size of Iraq and, with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units in every province, it is unclear how Trump plans to secure arms depots absent boots on the ground.The basic problem Trump faces is Khamenei’s belief that he can outlast Trump.Consider Yemen: In March 2025, Trump launched Operation Rough Rider, a bombing campaign to end the Houthis’ ability to target freedom of navigation.Fifty-three days and more than $1 billion later, Trump declared a unilateral deal in which he said the Houthis would cease targeted U.S. shipping in exchange for an end to the air campaign.Not only did he fail to coordinate his decision with the Yemeni forces fighting the Houthis, but his deal also accepted Houthi attacks on international shipping and the Houthis.It was a deal that made China Great Again, as shipping insurance rates are now three times lower for Chinese and Russian vessels that the Houthis let pass than for European allies, who must pay extortionate “tolls” or risk Houthi attacks.If Trump is willing to cut a deal that leaves Israel out in the cold on the Houthis, Iranian leaders would be right to figure that he would ot do the same thing regarding Iran itself?While Israel’s goal is to eliminate an existential threat, Trump might settle for a declaration of a deal that will further his quest to win a Nobel Peace Prize.Iranian leaders, of course, know that such a deal need not be permanent; it only needs to outlast Trump. Tehran can sidestep enforcement in other ways, playing anti-sanctions Three-Card Monte by conducting its nuclear work in North Korea, for example.The Iranian regime has always been apt students of U.S. politics. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif studied at the University of Denver, and many senior Iranian officials send their children to the United States or other Western countries to study.A desire to avoid lame duck status more than literal ambition likely drives Trump’s rhetoric about seeking a third term, but both biology and the midterm elections will end the delusion that Trump is anything but a lame duck.Iran’s traditional playbook of miring negotiations into endless discussion of details might not work with Trump, but there are other ways to run down the clock:The Islamic Republic can agree to any deal, but simply stop implementing it as soon as Trump leaves office or Democrats take control after mid-term elections.While the Iranian regime likely fears a 2029 Marco Rubio presidency, Khamenei might gamble that a Democrat or JD Vance-style isolationist will win.If Rubio does rise to the presidency, then Khamenei or any future successor figure will have time to strike a new deal and avert military action.Iran: What Should the U.S. Military Do?Trump may be raising leverage ahead of a negotiated deal. What he does not understand is that regime survival is not a neutral outcome.If Khamenei or the broader regime survives, the Islamic Republic will claim victory, much as Hamas has over Israel and the Houthis have after Operation Rough Rider.There is no substitute for regime change. Any deal will be, from the Islamic Republic’s point-of-view, transitory, but the problem has always been less Iran’s potential nuclear weapons and more the regime that would wield them.The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not only a military but also a business conglomerate worth upwards of $100 billion.If Trump can demand billion-dollar membership fees to the Gaza Board of Peace, he should also demand that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members hand over their bank accounts in exchange for their lives. He must announce a deadline for defection.Trump must also go to the heart of the regime: Its revenue. Since the Islamic Republic exports 90 percent of its oil through the Kharg Oil Terminal, it should seize Kharg.If Tehran cannot pay its salaries, Revolutionary Guardsmen and their Iraqi and Lebanese proxies will fade away. He might even use the proceeds from Kharg to fund a transitional Iranian government.Al Qaeda founder Usama Bin Laden once quipped that everyone rallies around a strong horse; weakness repulses. Trump must therefore not deal with the Iranian leadership in any way that conveys weakness or respect; rather, his goal should be humiliation.If Khamenei and his associates do not find themselves like late Qassem Soleimani on the wrong end of a U.S. predator, they should be perp-walked in chains to show those around them what humiliated losers they are.The Heart of Any Trump Iran StrategyThat Trump does not play by a staid diplomatic rule book is an advantage, but his end goal matters. Bombing will not be enough to defeat ideology. How Trump drains Iran’s resources and delegitimizes the Islamic Republic’s ideology matters.The post Just bombing Iran is a strategy that will fail appeared first on World Israel News.