Why did the US strike Iran?

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A plume of smoke rises after an explosion on February 28, 2026, in Tehran, Iran. | Getty ImagesEditor’s note, February 28, 2026, 12:05 pm ET: This article was originally published on February 19, in the lead-up to war in Iran and updated on February 28 after airstrikes had begun.President Donald Trump announced early Saturday morning that the US and Israel had launched an attack on Iran, saying the goal was to eliminate an “imminent threat” from Iran, “raze their missile industry to the ground” and “annihilate their navy,” and for Iranians to overthrow their government.The strikes began on Saturday morning, Tehran time, and appeared to be aimed at regime leadership targets, including the offices and residences of senior officials — and possibly including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In response, Iran has launched a wave of retaliatory missile against US and Israeli targets in the region, as well as US allies including Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The bombing comes after weeks of buildup in the region, and all indications before the strikes suggested it will be a larger and more extensive campaign than what we saw last summer — or than most Americans were probably prepared for. And at the moment, both sides seem dangerously confident they will prevail.Here are a few key questions about the operation to keep in mind for the days ahead:What has the US military been up to in the Middle East?Trump first threatened new military action against Iran in January, promising “help is on the way” when protests over economic conditions broke out throughout the country and were brutally repressed by Iran’s theocratic regime. Trump ultimately held off at the time at the urging of regional allies, as well as some of his own advisers, when it became clear that the US military — at the time engaged in major operations around Venezuela — didn’t have sufficient assets in the region to deter Iranian counterattacks. That is no longer the case. The United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups to the region, each with three destroyer escorts, as well as half a dozen other surface ships and — almost certainly — nuclear submarines whose locations are not disclosed. Dozens of aircraft, including F-22 and F-16 fighters jets and surveillance planes were deployed around the Middle East as well — the greatest concentration of airpower in the region since the buildup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The US has also worked to replenish air defense batteries that were depleted by Iranian missile and drone strikes during June’s “12-day war.”In short, analysts suggest this is enough firepower for an engagement lasting multiple weeks, not just a few hours or days. Why is this happening? What does America want from Iran?This is something of a moving target. Trump’s threat to Iran in January was in response to the massacre of protesters. But the protests largely subsided, and it’s too late to rescue the thousands who were massacred. Nonetheless, Trump on Saturday called for Iranians to “take over your government,” effectively calling for a new mass uprising along with the airstrikes. But the main discussions before the attack concerned Iran’s nuclear program. Though this program was severely degraded by US airstrikes in June (Trump proclaimed it “obliterated”), the Trump administration is calling for Iran to abandon nuclear enrichment entirely, the process that can be used to create material for weapons. Iran, which maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful, is insisting on its right to enrich, though it has indicated a willingness to make some concessions, such as diluting its stock of near weapons-grade enriched uranium. In the week leading up to the airstrikes, the administration also put forward a few more specific claims. One was that Iran was, in the words of US Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, just “a week away” from having enough weapons-grade uranium to build a bomb. This is a reference to Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium — currently unaccounted for — which is just a short technical step away from weapons grade, though Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was badly damaged last summer and most experts don’t believe it’s actually currently working to weaponize it.There were reports in the days leading up to the strikes that Iran might be willing to dilute this material in exchange for sanctions relief, perhaps even beyond the levels that were required in the 2015 nuclear deal, but this evidently wasn’t enough to convince Trump that it was worth continuing to negotiate. The United States also sought to expand the talks to encompass issues including Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for regional proxy groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. Iran has been extremely resistant to this. For all the focus on nuclear weapons, Iran’s ballistic missiles may end up being the crux of this crisis: They’re a particular concern for Israel, which is in range of them. But Iran also views them as a core component of its ability to defend itself. Trump also claimed in his recent State of the Union address that Iran was “working to build missiles that will soon reach the United States of America,” but US intelligence agencies believe it is years away from such a capability. There were reports in the lead-up to Saturday’s operation that the initial goal of strikes might be to pressure Iran into making concessions — on its nuclear program, missiles, and perhaps other issues as well. But Trump’s recent rhetoric suggests the United States seeks not to make a deal with the Islamic Republic, but to eliminate it. Trump said earlier this month that regime change in Iran is “the best thing that could happen.” Many Iranians would surely agree, though Trump did not elaborate on what he envisioned replacing the regime if they were to follow through on his call to overthrow it. What would the war look like? Americans may assume that war will look something like June’s “Operation Midnight Hammer,” a relatively brief series of strikes that was resolved quickly. That does not appear to be the case. The June war was a primarily Israeli operation, with the US joining in to attack three Iranian nuclear facilities a week in, when it was already clear that the Israelis were having military success and Iran’s retaliation was limited. This time around, the United States is in the driver’s seat from the start, though Israel is involved. And reporting suggests the administration has a more extensive operation in mind. According to the Wall Street Journal, the options Trump was presented with by military briefers included a “campaign to kill scores of Iranian political and military leaders, with the goal of overthrowing the government…as well as an air attack that would be limited to striking targets including nuclear and ballistic-missile facilities.” Both types of campaigns could potentially last for weeks. Of course, the reality could well turn out quite different: Ahead of the US intervention in Venezuela, few predicted that the United States would simply capture the country’s president while leaving most of its regime in place. Trump has shown a willingness in the past, as in the airstrikes against Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels last year, to walk away from military campaigns with limited wins even when underlying issues are left unresolved. In June, Iranian retaliation against US forces in the Middle East was limited and telegraphed in advance. That may not be the case this time, as Iran’s leaders may feel they’re in an existential fight for survival that requires a stronger response, and all indications so far suggest the Iranians were much more prepared to retaliate and have a much higher tolerance for risk.Though its nuclear program may be in shambles, the regime has worked diligently since last summer to reconstitute its ballistic missile deterrent. How much damage it is really capable of inflicting is an open question, though Israel was reportedly running dangerously low on interceptors by the end of the 12-day war and may have sustained more casualties if the conflict had lasted longer. Iran conducted exercises in recent weeks that temporarily shut down the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil chokepoint through which 31 percent of the world’s sea-born crude flows. Trump has clearly grown more confident about using military force, but Iran’s calculation may be that he has little tolerance for a long, drawn-out, messy conflict. In Trump’s more than five years as president, one thing we have not yet seen is how he would respond to a conflict with a significant number of US casualties. It’s notable in that context that Trump explicitly warned the public on Saturday that “the lives of courageous American heroes may be lost, and we may have casualties.” What do other countries think?Though the Israeli government was reportedly concerned in January about the state of their air defenses, they were a participant in the attacks early Saturday. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, deeply unpopular heading into elections later this year, would no doubt much rather keep the public focused on the destruction of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs than the swirling questions about his handling of the October 7 attacks. As for other regional countries, the picture is more mixed. During the Obama administration and Trump’s first term, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states pushed for a maximally hawkish position on Iran. Today, while they would no doubt prefer an end to the Islamic Republic, they’re less enthusiastic about war, due to concerns about Iranian retaliation as well as the regional destabilization that could result from a collapse of the Iranian regime. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have said they will not allow the United States to use their airspace for an attack on Iran, though it does not seem to have spared the UAE from Iranian retaliation.The UK had reportedly sought to prevent the US from using its airbases for an attack on Iran, including the strategically located base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, prompting an angry outburst from Trump early this week. So far, the European allies seem tentatively supportive, with a joint statement from leaders of the UK, France and Germany that puts the blame for the conflict on Iran while also calling for the resumption of negotiations. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who has clashed with Trump over trade and foreign policy in the past, also endorsed the strikes. As for Iran’s few allies, it conducted joint naval drills with Russia’s military in February and was reportedly nearing completion of a deal to buy supersonic anti-ship missiles from China, but it’s hard to imagine either Moscow or Beijing doing much to come to Tehran’s aid now that war has begun. Is any of this legal?The administration did not ask Congress for an authorization to use military force against Iran, or present a detailed legal rationale for doing so. Given that Iran’s nuclear program is, according to the administration’s own assessments, nowhere close to producing a weapon, and given that the United States is not in range of Iranian missiles, it would be hard to make the case that it constitutes the type of imminent threat that would allow the president to order military action without congressional authorization. Past administrations, including Trump’s after Midnight Hammer, have argued that military operations that are limited in scope and duration don’t constitute “war” in the constitutional sense and don’t require authorization. Many legal scholars don’t buy that, but even if you do, it would get harder to justify it if the war turns out to be the kind of expansive operation reportedly under discussion. In Congress, after several weeks of delay, Reps. Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Thomas Massie (R-KY) are planning to move next week to force a vote on a resolution that would require the administration to seek congressional authorization, but previous efforts to do this under the Trump administration have not been successful. In all likelihood, congressional oversight of Trump’s ability to wage war is about to be further watered down. Pride before the warIn fairness to Trump, in each of his previous military engagements, dating back to the strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in his first term, he has been able to defy critics who warned he was risking a dangerous quagmire. But if he is really contemplating an operation as extensive as what has been reported or pursuing the overthrow of the Iranian state itself, this suggests he may be growing confident to the point he’s considering just the sort of war he has lambasted previous presidents for getting involved with. Both sides appeared dangerously confident about their prospects heading into a conflict: The United States in its ability to inflict damage on Iran at will without significant blowback; Iran in its ability to make the conflict so painful for the United States that it can inflict a strategic defeat rather than hastening its own demise after a year that has left it severely weakened, economically, politically, and militarily.The confidence on both sides may end up getting a lot of people killed.